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 enlarge | Author: Patrick Cockburn
Publisher: Scribner
Category: Book
List Price: $24.00
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Avg. Customer Rating:  8 reviews
Sales Rank: 34527
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 240
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.5
Dimensions (in): 9.1 x 6 x 1.1
ISBN: 1416551476
Dewey Decimal Number: 956.7044092
EAN: 9781416551478
ASIN: 1416551476
Publication Date: April 8, 2008
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| Showing reviews 6-8 of 8 | | « PREV | | |
 A brief (but presently the only) biography of perhaps the most important figure in Iraq. May 4, 2008
6 out of 6 found this review helpful
General Petraeus' recent report to Congress contained the name of only one person. It was not Nouri Al-Maliki (Prime Minister of Iraq) or Abu Ayyub Al-Masri (head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq), but Muqtada Al-Sadr, the subject of this book. That, combined with the fact that it is the only biography of Sadr on the market establishes its importance.
In the first chapter, the author establishes his bona fides showing that he is not a journalist that never ventures out of the Green Zone. He gives a dramatic account of an incident with Sadr supporters at a check-point as he was attempting to travel to Najaf to interview an official within the Sadrist movement.
In the subsequent chapters, the reader receives a thumbnail sketch of the Shia in Iraq and offers a biography of Muqtada's predecessors in leading the movement, who were his father and his father's cousin. While seemingly sparse, it is actually the fullest account of their lives that can be found (in English, at least). Also, while some may balk that there are so many chapters that do not deal with Muqtada himself, it is absolutely vital context that allows the reader to understand the nature of the movement that Muqtada became the leader of.
Most of the balance of the book is devoted to Muqtada's role in the events following the invasion of Iraq. As was the case with the first chapter, the coverage is enhanced due to Cockburn's 'outside the safe zone' reporting.
The strength of the book lies in the biographical details on the Sadr's gained from personal interviews. They are to be found nowhere else and will certainly be a building block for any subsequent biographies. The book makes for lively reading and because of that, can easily be read in the span of an evening or two.
There are two flaws I found in the book, one fairly trivial, the other one representing a significant caveat. The trivial one lies in how the early chapters are written. They are very choppy chronologically, there are multiple points where the author gets ahead of himself and the reader is continually jumped back and forth between recent and distant past. The more significant one deals with topics outside of the biography. One example is how Cockburn breezily dismisses claims of Iranian support for the Sadr movement (in which the evidence was the roadside bombs being used) by stating that roadside bombs have been used since the 1920's. But there was more to the case than he reports: The damning evidence was the very specific design that was being used. Another is by offering Petraeus' statement on improved security in Baghdad and dismissing it with a statement that only a trickle of people have returned to their original neighborhood. Clearly, the two statements are not exclusive. It is unfortunate that his analysis and reporting of American leaders is wholly lacking the nuance and detail that exists when he deals with figures in the Sadrist movement.
The flaws notwithstanding, I was very glad to see this book's appearance and was pleased with it overall. As brief as it is, it still represents the most comprehensive account of Muqtada and his movement out there. While there will certainly be more thorough books in the future (it is practically a given that someone will attempt a comparison of Sadr's movement and Hizbollah), this will more than suffice for now. Four stars.
 Stalingrad in Iraq April 27, 2008
5 out of 7 found this review helpful
"Stalingrad in Iraq" deserves to be a subtitle of this thin but illuminating volume. The US Army is as entombed in Iraq as the German 6th Army was in the Soviet city along the Volga. The end results are the same in both cases: strategic defeat. Not defeat yet to come, but defeat that is already an accomplished fact: none of the Army's tactical victories can or will alter the fact. I suspect much of the Iraqi resistance knows this while the US refuses to admit it; the Germans never did until it was too late to matter. Interestingly, the book's main character, Muqtada Al-Sadr, doesn't really make an appearance until the end. The author justifies this by stating that the man cannot be understood apart from his family history and the history of Shia Islam. Even before the war began I never believed that the US or its British poodle would have a snowball's chance in Hell of succeeding. Certainly the US experience in Vietnam, the French experience in Vietnam and Algeria, and the British experience in Iraq should have provided some clue to the Coalition's clueless leaders. The religious dimension is crucial to understanding the unfolding catastrophe. The emergence of Shia Islam in Iraq as THE major player alters the region's whole balance of power and threatens to destroy American predominance there for good or certainly for the foreseeable future. The Shias have a very long memory, as this book well explains: what happened 1400 years ago is as current to them as yesterday's news is to us. They never forget and know that their moment has come. Iraq is the spiritual and historical heart of Shia Islam. More than anyone else, so millions believe, Muqtada Al-Sadr exemplifies this conjunction of faith, power and political savvy. The US demonizes him as they demonized Saddam. There is one difference, Al-Sadr is the genuine article while Saddam was nothing more than a hapless egomanical clown--he was easy to knock over, Al-Sadr won't be. Like it or not, he is Iraq's future. this excellent book explains why.
Excellent but with some limitations April 21, 2008
11 out of 15 found this review helpful
As an account of the violent and tragic recent history of Iraq's Shi'a, I would give this book five stars. I learned a great deal about the Shi'a faith and the Sadr Trend as well as about the other major Shi'a factions such as the Dawa and SCIRI. It's a pity that this account was not available and read by the policy makers before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It might have spared us some grief or at least explained a lot of Iraqi behavior that must have seemed inexplicable at the time.
But I couldn't help but think that the book was a little bit thin about the man mentioned in the title, Muqtada Sadr. Given the fact that the book is only 204 pages long (and not 240 as listed here) and the fact that Muqtada is not discussed until well into the book, that's not that surprising.
I also think that the book is less than authoritative when critiquing US policy inside Iraq. Unlike when he focuses on the politics of the Shi'a clergy, Cockburn doesn't seem to have done quite as thorough a job explaining why Paul Bremer and the other major American actors in Iraq thought and acted the way that they did.
I also think that the book bends over backwards to excuse, minimize, and rationalize the fact that the Iranians causing trouble for us in Iraq, trouble that is getting some of our people killed there. Cockburn never really provides the documentation for his claims that what the Iranians are doing doesn't amount to very much. He just makes the statement and lets it hang there as if it was unchallengeable.
But in the end, it's still well-worth reading. I just don't think that it's unbiased or the last word on the topic.
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