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 enlarge | Author: Eliot A. Cohen
Publisher: Anchor
Category: Book
List Price: $15.00
Buy New: $5.49
You Save: $9.51 (63%)
New (31) Used (23) from $3.45
Avg. Customer Rating:  34 reviews
Sales Rank: 197032
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 320
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.6
Dimensions (in): 7.8 x 5.1 x 0.7
ISBN: 1400034043
Dewey Decimal Number: 322.5
EAN: 9781400034048
ASIN: 1400034043
Publication Date: September 9, 2003
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Condition: BRAND NEW!! Factory Fresh!-Multiple Copies Available
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| Customer Reviews:
Fully-vetted argument; could have been expanded January 10, 2007
0 out of 2 found this review helpful
Eliot Cohen's work informs the current debate on the use of force to attain political objectives and the role of the statesman or politician compared to that of the soldier. His use of case studies is effective in proving his basic argument - that the normal theory of civil military relations is an inadequate explanation for success in war. But Cohen's poignant discussion does leave some questions unanswered on the military profession's place in a democracy:
- Understanding that Cohen's focus was on wartime leadership, the reader still could have gained benefit from a parallel discussion of the use of force in peacetime (e.g. U.N. Security Council Resolution enforcement, sanctions, show of force/posturing). In today's strategic environment, regional military personnel (combatant commanders) wield great power in peacetime foreign policy formulation. A treatment of the combatant commander's influence in foreign policy and the ethics of an unelected government official wielding such power would be valuable.
- Especially relevant today is a treatment of the retired military officer's place in a democracy: outspoken critic, advocate, or silent observer. Many, including Cohen apparently (see p. 171 comparing retired soldiers to "true civilians" in Israeli society), believe that for retirees to criticize a military strategy or the policy that guides the strategy degrades civil-military relations. I have the greatest contention with this thought. Military personnel, active duty or retired, have a stake in the outcome of the state's foreign policy machinations, and it is appropriate for them to state that opinion. As a former great citizen-soldier commented, "When we assumed the Soldier, we did not lay aside the Citizen."
The negative tone of this review should not detract from Cohen's excellent treatment of the subject. Supreme Command furthers the debate on civil-military relations and those in the defense establishment stand to gain from a careful study of this work, be they soldier or civilian.
 Senior Military Leaders Must Read This Book November 10, 2006
0 out of 3 found this review helpful
Senior Military Leaders Must Read This Book.
A must read for any military officer or civilian leader in the Department of Defense. Anyone interested in leadership will benefit from reading the lessons of leadership by great men during difficult times. 5 stars.
 Scattered and loses focus June 18, 2006
2 out of 6 found this review helpful
Eliot Cohen has an impressive background in policy work (OSD) and academia (Naval War College and Harvard). I had high hopes for this book because I thought his experience with the military combined with his academic work would produce a focused and well-grounded work. I was disappointed. I never really bought his argument that political leaders can lead war better than generals. He seemed to cherry pick leaders than fit his mold. I could not believe that someone who works so closely with the military would generalize military leadership in such a stereotypical way.
The article might have made a good article in a foreign affairs journal, but the author seemed to fill out the book with a lot of interesting but not really relevant historical stories and facts. The Lincoln chapter providing nothing that has not been stated numerous times in more detailed and focused work. The Churchill chapter was the best. Cohen obviously has extensively studied Churchill. His sections on how the historical view of Churchill have ebbed and flowed over the years was well done, thought not rally tied to the focus of the book. I learned the most from the Ben-Gurion, since I knew the least about him.
The book may be useful to an undergraduate class studying political leadership or foreign policy, but beyond that the book unfortunately offers little that is new or of great interest.
 Square peg into round hole (or, stop after the 4 bios) February 26, 2006
5 out of 12 found this review helpful
This would have been 4 stars had I stopped after the individual chapters on Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill and David Ben Gurion. However, I unfortunately found out, in the subsequent chapter, that Cohen's REAL purpose was an end-around to attack American leadership during Vietnam (and, to a lesser extent, the Gulf War). For a book that focuses on leaders from England, France, and Israel, as well as the US, this struck me as a non-sequitor out of left field.
I do recommend purchasing this book. However, do NOT continue reading beyond the Ben Gurion chapter. You will become disappointed with your purchase.
Not a well thought out book. December 1, 2005
6 out of 10 found this review helpful
The writer tries to generalize from the experience of four great statesmen in war times to make a conclusion that politicians should tell generals what to do!
I think this book is political biased.
Say if I was to reverse the equation and generalize from the experience of four great generals to make a conclusion that generals should tell statesmen what to do! Would the writer agree with me?
I could also write a few essays where democratic leaders just left his military leaders to do their job and the military leaders did a very good job eg prime minister Eshkol of Israel in the six day war and the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indian Gandhi in December 1971 in the Indian Pakistan war. Is the conclusion now that statesmen should stay out of the actual war.
Also I should stress is that most people are not *great*. To try to generalize from a few great men is a very dangerous experience. Great men by their nature are gifted and unusual.
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