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The Marne, 1914: The Opening of World War I and the Battle That Changed the World |  | Author: Holger H. Herwig
Publisher: Random House
Category: Book
List Price: $28.00
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Seller: LUCASMAR
Rating:  20 reviews
Sales Rank: 17158
Media: Hardcover
Edition: 1St Edition
Pages: 416
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.6
Dimensions (in): 9.4 x 6.3 x 1.4
ISBN: 1400066719
Dewey Decimal Number: 940.421
EAN: 9781400066711
ASIN: 1400066719
Publication Date: December 1, 2009
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Product Description
It is one of the essential events of military history, a cataclysmic encounter that prevented a quick German victory in World War I and changed the course of two wars and the world. Now, for the first time in a generation, here is a bold new account of the Battle of the Marne. A landmark work by a distinguished scholar, The Marne, 1914 gives, for the first time, all sides of the story. In remarkable detail, and with exclusive information based on newly unearthed documents, Holger H. Herwig superbly re-creates the dramatic battle, revealing how the German force was foiled and years of brutal trench warfare were made inevitable.
Herwig brilliantly reinterprets Germany’s aggressive “Schlieffen Plan”–commonly considered militarism run amok–as a carefully crafted, years-in-the-making design to avoid a protracted war against superior coalitions. He also paints a new portrait of the run-up to the Marne: the Battle of the Frontiers, long thought a coherent assault but really a series of haphazard engagements that left “heaps of corpses,” France demoralized, Belgium in ruins, and Germany emboldened to take Paris.
Finally, Herwig puts in dazzling relief the Battle of the Marne itself: the French resolve to win, which included the exodus of 100,000 people from Paris (where even pigeons were placed under state control in case radio communications broke down), the crucial lack of coordination between Germany’s First and Second Armies, and the fateful “day of rest” taken by the Third Army. He provides revelatory new facts about the all-important order of retreat by Germany’s Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch, previously an event hardly documented and here freshly reconstructed from diary excerpts.
Herwig also provides stunning cameos of all the important players: Germany’s Chief of General Staff Helmuth von Moltke, progressively despairing and self-pitying as his plans go awry; his rival, France’s Joseph Joffre, seemingly weak but secretly unflappable and steely; and Commander of the British Expeditionary Force John French, arrogant, combative, and mercurial.
The Marne, 1914 puts into context the battle’s rich historical significance: how it turned the war into a four-year-long fiasco that taught Europe to accept a new form of barbarism and stoked the furnace for the fires of World War II. Revelatory and riveting, this will be the new source on this seminal event.
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Showing reviews 1-5 of 20
Faulty Command & Control Doomed the Schlieffen Plan April 9, 2010
R. A Forczyk (Laurel, MD USA)
3 out of 3 found this review helpful
There have been a great many books written about the Battle of the Marne in September 1914, so why you ask do we need one more? Professor Holger H Herwig's narrative of the battle seeks to diverge from the standard Anglo-French historiography of the battle and look at it from the German perspective (i.e. more on how the battle was lost, rather than how it was won). His primary hypothesis about the root cause of the German defeat is that faulty command and control (C2) techniques - including poor leadership in key positions - doomed the so-called Schlieffen Plan. It is a good hypothesis which the professor does an effective job of supporting, although he does not mention that there are competing hypotheses, such as Martin van Creveld's well-argued Supplying War (1977), which shows that the Schlieffen Plan was logistically unsound. Other hypotheses argue that von Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff, doomed the Schlieffen Plan by excessive operational changes. Herwig also provides value-added content by incorporating documents gleaned from recently-released archives in former East Germany, although this represents only a tiny portion of his supporting evidence. Overall, the strength of Herwig's The Marne 1914 is as a fine analysis of command and control failure at the operational-level.
Unfortunately, there are a number of irksome qualities about this book, beginning with the awful maps copied from the West Point Atlas of WW1. It is extremely difficult to follow unit movements or actions on these maps (e.g. von Gronau's impressive spoiling attack on the Ourq River that robbed Joffre's counterstroke of surprise and Third Army's night bayonet attack that threw Foch's Ninth Army back (the map shows only some arrows, but no indication where the corps and divisions the author mentions were located). While there are some first-person accounts incorporated, overall the author's battle narrative is rather sterile and difficult to follow. He also put me off at the beginning when he stated that the "Battle of the Marne" was not just about the actions fought on the outskirts of Paris, but about the entire campaign fought between 1 August and 10 September 1914. His early chapters on the frontier battles seem to distract from his main hypothesis and then once the action heats up around Paris he simply drops coverage of Alsace-Lorraine. Finally, the author never really gets into the nuts and bolts of military doctrine, tactics or organization. When he claims that each German corps had 144 135-mm guns (in fact, the German Army had a total of only 4 13.5cm K09 guns in 1914), which would translate into over 4,000 13.5cm guns, it's easy to see that he has skimmed over important details. Instead, the author spends a great deal of time discussing German atrocities committed against civilians in Belgium - which again is not very germane to his hypothesis.
Professor Herwig is on firmer ground with the faulty C2 hypothesis. He points out that unlike the elder von Moltke in the successful 1870-71 France-Prussian War, the younger Moltke made no effort to get out of his headquarters in Luxembourg and spent the entire campaign hundreds of miles from the front. This "chateau generalship" could have been mitigated if Moltke had used telephones and couriers to keep in touch with his advancing armies, but Herwig does a good job pointing out how little the German army made use of the latest means of communication in 1914. Not only did Moltke not have reliable communications with each army, but the armies could barely communicate with their neighbors on each flank or with their subordinate corps. Finally, once the Allies began their counterattack on the Marne, the weakness of key commanders such as von Bulow aggravated the inability of Moltke to orchestrate the campaign. Some of this more a question of leadership rather than C2 per se. Overall, this a very well-argued hypothesis, but whether or not it was THE key reason why the German invasion failed is less certain. Van Creveld's hypothesis also demonstrated that the Germans simply could not effectively supply their armies outside Paris, while the French were fighting right next to their main supply base. Herwig also comments that the French commander, Joffre, relied on interior lines and railroads to shift troops to the Paris area to gain a numerical superiority at the critical point, while Moltke was relying on exterior lines and infantry marching on foot; this seems like a no-brainer at any military staff college, but apparently it never occurred to von Schlieffen or Moltke. In short, why were the Germans surprised that the French could quickly transfer troops to defend their capital? Another related reason for the German defeat that the author brings up, is that the Germans were surprised that the French still had the spirit to launch furious counterattacks after weeks of retreating - this suggests that the General Staff based too much of their planning on the enemy they fought in 1870, not the one they would face in 1914.
In the end, the author essentially concludes that the great German General Staff and a few key commanders suffered a mental melt-down on 6 September 1914 and robbed Imperial Germany of possible victory. He does not claim that German victory was inevitable if they had not retreated from Paris, but he does suggest that they might have at least walked away with some tactical victories on the Ourq and against Foch's 9th Army that could have left them in a better position for the fall campaigns. Perhaps.
The Mother of all Battles March 1, 2010
Sacramento Book Review (Sacramento, CA)
1 out of 3 found this review helpful
Holger Herwig has done something impressive. He is one of the very few historians of World War I to write in English, using French, German and British sources. The result is an authoritative account of one of the most significant battles of the 20th century. Herwig offers his readers a careful analysis of the opening battles of World War I. He rejects the argument that Barbara Tuchman made popular that war plans drove the European powers into the conflict. Herwig shows that there was a good deal of diplomacy in the summer of 1914 and the various general staffs tinkered with their plans as they saw fit. He also rejects recent scholarship that minimizes Kaiser Wilhelm II's influence. For better or worse--and it was generally for the worse--the Emperor was a crucial decision maker. Herwig weighs in on the controversy involving Richard Hentsch, a lieutenant colonel on the German General Staff. While Hentsch made mistakes, Herwig argues that he has proven to be a handy scapegoat for bad generalship. The text is littered with useful maps. The writing, though, is only adequate.
Reviewed by Nicholas Sarantakes
The Great Opening Battle of WWI February 28, 2010
Michael B. Crutcher (Louisville, KY USA)
0 out of 1 found this review helpful
The Battle of the Marne was the crucial battle of World War I, when French troops commanded by Chief of the General Staff Joseph "Papa" Joffre, stopped the German steamroller at the gates of Paris. The German commander was Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke "the Younger," to distinguish him from his illustrious uncle, Moltke the Elder, the victor of 1870. The battle deserves and receives a first-rate retelling by Holger H. Herwig in The Marne, 1914, The Opening of World War I and the Battle that Changed the World. Using German war records now available after the collapse of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany,) Herwig emphasizes the battle from the German point of view. This brings balance and nuance to the story, which has been traditionally told from the viewpoint primarily of the French but also the British defenders.
Joffre is the hero of Herwig's account. Far from being a passive and phlegmatic figure, as he is sometimes portrayed, Papa Joffre issued decisive orders, sacked unlucky generals and hurried from battle to battle in an automobile driven by a former Grand Prix driver. Joffre initially misread the battlefield. He did not realize that the main German blow would be struck by the German right wing in a sweep through Belgian and then a turn east of Paris. Initially, Joffre attacked in the Saar and then and only belatedly turned his attention to the German forces on his left. He thus lost the initial and confused opening battles of the war, called the Battle of the Frontiers, but prepared for and won the far more important battle on the Marne.
Moltke was a study in contrast. Content to maintain his headquarters in Luxemburg, he was almost entirely out of touch with his army commanders. Rather than give precise orders, he dispatched liaison officers to offer "suggestions" to his generals. This lead almost inevitably to disputes among his commanders, which Moltke failed to resolve, and gaps in the German line, which the French and British penetrated to halt the German advance. He also had to mollify the mercurial Kaiser Wilhelm II, who was in attendance at the headquarters and fancied himself Commander-in-Chief. Moltke eventually suffered a nervous breakdown and was relieved of command.
Herwig colors his account with interesting details and tidbits. The first blow struck in the war between French and German troops was from a sabre! And the second was from a lance! But the account is also filled with references to various place names, which to the casual (non-French) reader are colorful but meaningless. The maps also vary greatly in quality and none are really sufficient to follow the flow of the action. And although this is a quibble, I am truly tired of titles that claim some event "changed the world." This seems now to be a publishing staple. If all these "changes" are to believed, the world is changed by everything. I exempt Mr. Herwig from this criticism as I suspect his publisher is responsible for embellishing things.
The conclusion of the Battle of the Marne established a battle-line across Europe that would remain in deadlock until 1918, with enormous casualties on both sides from the senseless slaughter of men by machines and shell. Joffre's steadfastness prevented a quick French defeat, as would happen in May-June 1940. Would that the combatants have sought peace after the battle! Not only would millions of deaths have been prevented in World War I but perhaps, just perhaps, there never would have been a World War II.
Herwig, a professor of history at the University of Calgary and the author of other histories on WWI, is a fine writer with a clear grasp of the history of the time and military tactics. The book is perhaps best suited for a reader who already has some knowledge of WWI and so can place his discussion and conclusions regarding its opening battle in a larger context. For those readers, this volume is highly recommended.
 Excellent book that compares well with the standard Guns of August February 24, 2010
J. Groen (GURNEE, ILLINOIS USA)
0 out of 1 found this review helpful
This is an excellent book on the start of World War I which compares well with what is probably the best known book of this period - the Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman.
The author starts the book with the events that led up to the start of World War I. The assassination of the Austrian prince, the ultimatum by Austria to Serbia, the support by Germany, and the continual mistakes by the politicians in each country that led to declaration of war. But, then again, maybe these weren't mistakes, maybe the countries wanted to go to war to "cleanse themselves" and "end the boredom" as mentioned in the book. This was a brutal way to cleanse themselves or end the boredom. The author spent one chapter on this leadup.
Most of the book is spent on the military events from the start of the war in the West, i.e. Belgium and France, to the end of the battle of the Marne.
The book covers the French attack in Lorraine, the surprise in the Ardennes (when both armies attacked into each other), the taking of Liege, the invasion of Belgium, the battle of Mons and Le Cateau, Namur, Guise, etc and finally the battle of the Marne.
What comes through in the book is the stupidity of the German generals who led the armies on the wing that was responsible for the wheel through Belgium, the violent and brutal firepower that started the war and led to the trenches, and the heroism and continual stamina of both the French and German troops. The start of this war was truly hell with thousands of casualties on both sides from somewhat small actions resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties during the first two months (over 400,000 for the French). Some of the actions are shared in the book, including bayonet charges on machine guns and artillery. This was related a number of times, with typically the same result - thousands of casualties with no result. In one instance, a whole German division made a bayonet charge at night (removing their rifle bolts so they won't accidentally discharge them) on artillery, took the artillery and then was devastated by the French counterattack.
Ultimately, what comes through in this book is the futility of war and especially this war. World War I was truly a period when the common soldier was cannon fodder and this book highlights that well.
For this reason, I highly recommend this book to all readers. We can't have too many of these books so that we can understand the stupidity of war so that it won't happen again.
A GREAT ADDITION TO THE LARGE BODY OF WORK ALREADY AVAILABLE. February 8, 2010
D. Blankenship (The Ozarks)
2 out of 3 found this review helpful
I have on my shelves something toward twenty five to thirty five books either addressing this battle directly as in individual enity, or large sections of several of some of these books which include this particular battle either in part or as a whole, along with other accounts and other aspects of WWI. If you do a google search and type in "The Marne," you are given a choice of 9,460,000 choices...at the time of this writing. I must admit to coming very close to passing this one up when it was placed on the shelf at the local library, as I felt it most likely redundant, but all in all, I am glad I did not.
Beyond a doubt, The Battle of the Marne, which was fought in 1914 and was the first major encounter of WWI, is one of the tipping points of history. Never before, and hopefully never again, will such an event occur, nor an event with so much riding on the outcome. This battle led to what German military historian Gerhard Ritter called the "monotonous mutual mass murder," in the trenches over the next four years. In this battle France and Germany mobilized and amassed close to two million each and Britain very near 130,000 additional men. We are talking millions of lives lost and to a great extent, an entire society, way of life, and an era came to an end. This war directly gave us WWII, and if you look at if from a certain angle, ever war fought since, either directly or indirectly. We are what we are today due to this insane period in our history.
As has been pointed out, one of the reasons this work is a bit different, and the primary reason that I went ahead and read it, is that it perhaps places a bit more emphasis to the German point of view than many of the works I have. It was gratifying to find that the German High Command and indeed many of the field officers were just as incompetent, inept and foolish as were the French and English leaders. This work reinforced my long held belief that all aspects of this conflict were seen through the eyes of men whose minds were in the era of swords, bayonets, horses and single shot muskets. Their minds simply did not or could not envision, fathom or comprehend the weapons, the massively destructive weapons which had been developed since the Napoleonic or Franco-Prussian war. There is no doubt in my mind that the men who conducted this war on both sides, were in many ways absolutely clueless. The author has made this point in this work and made it well.
The author, Holger H. Herwig has drawn upon reference material which until the break-up of the Soviet Empire were unavailable. With the collapse of Eastern Germany, many records were found which were though to have been destroyed during WWII bombing raids. This alone makes this work worth the read. Of course there has been, as with any new work, the question of revisionist history brought into the mix when discussing this work. It is my position that we simply do not know and will not know the answer to that question until other scholars and competent military historians have had a chance to throw in their two bits. Now do be aware that this new information will not cast any blinding revelations on the subject nor changes the views of those that have studied this battle, but it will give the reader a different slant and some points to ponder that may well have been overlooked before.
This work is well written and reader be warned; it is extremely detailed! I personally like this sort of work, but that is personal preference and those that want only the "big picture" or broad overview will soon be overwhelmed by facts and military minutia. At times the author's style is a bit flat and lacks somewhat in the "excitement factor," something many will not enjoy. The prose though is exact and when read leaves the reader with a perfect understanding of the message the author is attempting to bring us. I found this work to be extremely readable.
It is interesting, as the author points out, to speculate the results of a German victory during this most decisive of battles. No four years of mass slaughter in the trenches, no WWII, No Hitler. On the other hand, we would have had almost complete dominance of Europe by the German Republic, then and for the foreseeable future.
The one thing I disliked about this work, and this is a major, major pet peeve with me, is the lack of quality maps and the lack of an adequate number of maps. This was an extremely complex battle with much movement by the various forces involved and covered a rather large area. Maps, maps, maps...it needs more and better maps. This is the only reason I am giving this one four stars rather than the five stars it would otherwise deserve.
World War Two was probably one of the greatest disasters (ranks right up there with the plague of several hundred years previous to these events) and I must say, in my opinion, one of the most mindless endeavors of mankind in the history of the world. This battle, this war is well worth delving into. It is a part of our history and the effects of this battle and of that war is still being felt even to this day and I dare say, for years to come.
I highly recommend this work. If your interest includes this era, then this work should be on your bookshelf.
Don Blankenship
The Ozarks
Showing reviews 1-5 of 20
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