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If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War: An Analysis of World War II Naval Strategy | 
 enlarge | Author: John A. Adams
Publisher: Indiana University Press
Category: Book
List Price: $34.95
Buy New: $15.00
You Save: $19.95 (57%)
New (26) Used (8) from $14.25
Avg. Customer Rating:  3 reviews
Sales Rank: 201842
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 458
Shipping Weight (lbs): 2
Dimensions (in): 9.3 x 6.1 x 1.6
ISBN: 0253351057
Dewey Decimal Number: 940.545
EAN: 9780253351050
ASIN: 0253351057
Publication Date: June 15, 2008
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Product Description
Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1660-1783) was one of the most influential books on military strategy in the first half of the 20th century. A core text in the naval war colleges of the United States, Britain, and Japan, Mahan's book shaped doctrine for the conduct of war at sea. Adams uses Mahan's ideas to discuss the great Pacific sea battles of World War II and to consider how well they withstood the test of actual combat. Reexamining the conduct of war in the Pacific from a single analytic viewpoint leads to some surprising conclusions about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Doolittle Raid, the Battle of the Coral Sea, the recapture of the Philippines, and the submarine war. Naval historians and armchair strategists alike will find much food for thought in these engrossing pages.
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| Customer Reviews:
 Strategic Thinking as Illustrated by the Pacific War August 8, 2008
1 out of 2 found this review helpful
This study could be used as an organizational management text book in a business school class. The author begins with a review of Mahan's principles, e.g., focus on the most essential task, never divide your fleet, and then applies these principles to the history of the Pacific War. Familiar historical episodes illustrate how difficult sticking to these simple principles is in practice. In the real world, competing demands from diverse power centers -- and competing personalities -- easily makes loss of focus and dilution of effort the more likely outcome. By the end of the book, we learned some lessons applicable to daily life, as well as some history. The writing style is engaging and non-technical. The reader need not possess detailed knowledge of history or military affairs. At the same time, endnotes are plentiful and probably helpful to more academic readers.
 An interesting approach July 27, 2008
5 out of 5 found this review helpful
I've read many books on the WWII Pacific Theater, but I'd never before come across a book that takes this particular approach. The author judges the various commanders at all levels from national leaders down to operational/tactical commanders by the standards of Mahan. Since Mahan was the be-all, end-all naval theorist as of WWII, the naval commanders on both sides had studied his writings in great depth. This would lead the reader to think that each commander faithfully applied Mahan's teachings. Not so. Many factors impinged on commanders execution of doctine, everything from political pressure to personal fatigue. When you add in Army commanders few of whom had studied Mahan, the situation got really confusing. In the author's view, Admirals King and Nimitz come out best and General MacArthur looks like an ego-driven stumblebum.
I found the book to be an easy read and fast paced while still thought provoking. The author made his points clearly, albeit with too many repetitions of fictional comments from Mahan. There were enough typos in the book to create a bit of confusion and irritation. The maps were well done and properly located - not always true of naval histories. Overall, this is an excellent introduction to how war doctrines are created and carried out.
Good analysis, slightly flawed by overuse of hindsight July 23, 2008
5 out of 5 found this review helpful
There are many books telling what happened in individual battles or to particular ships. This book tries to grade the thinking of those who determined where forces went into battle and why.
Mostly it succeeds at describing the strategic goals and thinking (or lack thereof!) of the admirals in charge of the Pacific War on both sides. Yamamoto gets failing grades for not ensuring that his brilliant and risky gambles were sufficiently followed through; King gets consistently fairly high grades; a number of characters on both sides are criticized for various flaws.
One flaw in this book is the over-use of hindsight; the author judges various strategic ideas as if everyone should have understood at the time things that did not become clear until much later; for instance, the total dominance of the aircraft carrier over the battleship, or the inability of high-altitude bombers to hit anything in motion. He several times criticizes admirals for not understanding that their cherished goal should only have been the means to an end (e.g., Ugaki's desire to take Guadalcanal) but does not realize that his somewhat repetitive chanting of "Never divide the fleet" or "Sink the carriers" are both ends toward maintaining control of the sea. (He probably should at least have looked at some of Sir Julian Corbett's criticisms of Mahan's work.)
That said, there are many excellent gems of observation, and quite a lot of good analysis, in the book. To experienced naval strategists, they will come as no surprise; to the vast majority of the human race and Pacific War buffs who are not, this will be a very useful learning course. Readers will probably want some previous acquaintance with the history of World War II in the Pacific, but given such acquaintance this is a challenging and rewarding analysis.
Highly recommended.
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