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MAGNIFICENT DISASTER: The Failure of the Market Garden, The Arnhem Operation, September 1944 | 
 enlarge | Author: David Bennett
Publisher: Casemate
Category: Book
List Price: $32.95
Buy New: $18.90
You Save: $14.05 (43%)
New (26) Used (9) from $18.45
Avg. Customer Rating:  4 reviews
Sales Rank: 80412
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 352
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.2
Dimensions (in): 9.1 x 6.1 x 1.2
ISBN: 1932033858
Dewey Decimal Number: 940
EAN: 9781932033854
ASIN: 1932033858
Publication Date: July 2008
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Product Description
After Normandy, the most spectacular Allied offensive of World War II was Operation Market Garden, which saw three divisions of paratroopers dropped behind German lines, to be joined by massive armored columns breaking through the front. The ultimate object was to seize a crossing over t the Rhine to outflank the heartland of the Third Reich and force a quick end to the war.The Operation utterly failed, of course, as the 1st British Airborne was practically wiped out, the American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions became tied down in vicious combat for months, and the vaunted armored columns were foiled at every turn by improvisational German defenses. In many circles the battle has become known as "Hitler's last victory."In this work, many years in the making, Professor Bennett puts forward a complete, balanced and comprehensive account of the British, American, Polish, Canadian and German actions, as well as the strategic background of the Operation in a way not yet done. He shows, for example, that rather than a bridgehead over the Rhine, Montgomery's ultimate aim was to flank the Ruhr industrial area from the north. The book also deals as never before with the key role of all three Corps of British Second Army, not just Horrocks' central XXX Corps. For the first time, we learn the dramatic, untold story of how a single company of Canadian engineers achieved the evacuation of 1st Airborne's survivors back across the Rhine when all other efforts had failed.Also revealed is the scandal of how Polish General Sosabowski was humiliated, insulted and dismissed by the mendacious hostility of the British military authorities. And the book shows, too, how the Operation would have failed at the outset but for the brilliant soldiery of the two American airborne divisions who overcame a variety of odds to achieve their objectives.Respectfully nodding to "A Bridge Too Far" and other excellent works on Market Garden, the author has interviewed survivors, walked the ground, and performed prodigious archival research to increase our understanding of the battle. From the actions of the lowliest soldier to the highest commander, Allied and German, the Operation develops in highly readable style, with the author's expert analysis unveiling new insights at every step. REVIEWS "...an informative volume... provides a wealth of detail. It will make a valuable addition to your collection if you're an enthusiast of Market Garden or the ETO in WWII..."Armorama, 07/2008"...interesting appendices and a most complete bibliography, making this probably one of the finest works on the subject yet done... both informative and entertaining... I give my highest recommendation for a superb read." Model Madness, 08/2008"...Reveals much of what history has tended to gloss over... This detailed examination of Market Garden should be a must read for all who have an interest in this operation." Airborne Quarterly, 08/2008
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| Customer Reviews:
 Fair, But Needs Work October 9, 2008
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
This account of Market-Garden does not measure up to others in spite of a good try. The narrative is somewhat difficult to follow, and the sweep of the battle is lost in the details. Some of the photos are good, but sometime, somewhere, someone will produce a book showing photos of all of the bridges, crossing sites, road features and general terrain features so the battlefield can be truly be pictured by the reader. Unfortunately, this does not happen in this book, nor are the maps sufficiently detailed to be of much use.
The author's assessment of Montgomery's fecklessness in attempting to plan this operation in a single week while ignoring the 15th Army on his left shoulder and neglecting to clear the Scheldt is not only accurate but welcome. The supply problem was of Montgomery's making, not as he attempted to imply, that he lost the battle because the Americans did not support his sufficiently or that Patton siphoned off supplies that he (Montgomery) should have received. The whole plan was a fantasy, as was the idea of a subsequent drive on Berlin by Montgomery at the head of his troops.
The author makes a number of points that improve and validate his presentation. He makes clear that against composite units thrown into the battle by the Germans, none above battle group size, the British were outfought and simply too slow in going from one phase of the battle to another. Horrocks did not lead from the front, and he failed to urge his troops forward at any time in the battle. As always, a lack of leadership brings failure. By contrast, the two American airborne divisions acquitted themselves extremely well under close, "up front" leadership, and it was due to their heroics that the operation accomplished as much as it did. The treatment of General Sosabowski by Essame, Myers, Taylor (of the DCLI), Horrocks, Browning and Montgomery was horrible, and they actively attempted to use him as a scapegoat for their own deficiencies. Even worse was Montgomery's spreading of falsehoods with respect to the Polish Brigade's performance.
I still recommend Ryan's "A Bride Too Far" for the Allied side, and Robert Kershaw's "It Never Snows In September" for the German side. Author Bennett does a creditable job, but with the poor editing and the impossibility of following the action with sufficient spatial cognition to make the reader feel like he understands what's happening, I cannot go higher than three stars.
 Not Great September 23, 2008
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Well written book, but totally lacking in maps. Detailed explanations of complex manuvers and tactical dispositions are not supported by maps. Even if you know where Einhoven, Driel and Arnhenm are located, make yourself a sketch map to follow the dialogue. If you are unfamiliar with the locations of these cities get a good road map and follow the narrative. The author also mixes his discussions with the names of American, British, Polish and German force actions. While a technique to keep the reader interested, it can be confusing without a map and diagram of the given orders of battle. His description of the action as British forces close on the Rhine is superb and very detailed. I only wished that he would have supplemented his text with maps and diagrams.
Poorly done September 1, 2008
1 out of 4 found this review helpful
This is a disorganized account with completely inadequate maps, and apparently no editor. Look elsewhere for Market-Garden information.
A Disappointing Work August 3, 2008
4 out of 6 found this review helpful
This is a fairly detailed tactical account of operation Market Garden, the allies attempt to establish a bridgehead over the Rhine in late 1944 by capturing a series of bridges using massed airborne forces.
On the positive side, the author, who from his bio appears to be an amatuer military historian, offers a detailed account of the operation primarily from the allied viewpoint but using sufficient German material to give a sense of the "other side of the hill". The narrative is often a little jerky, jumping around rapidly from unit to unit. However this is probably inevitable when describing a battle that involved three separate airborne areas of operation and a ground force component. The author offers his opinions freely during the text, though none of these are particularly suprising to anyone who has studied this battle.
The flaw in the book and the reason for my mediocre rating is the lack of any detailed maps. The author provides three high level maps which do little to assist the reader in visualizing the events described in the text. When describing action at the detailed, tactical level good maps are essential and their absence seriously degrades the book's value as a battle history. Other flaws include: very little background on the strategic situation, although this would not be a problem for anyone who is already familiar with the miltary history of WWII; minor but irritating editorial errors; and one or two apparent errors of fact. An example of the latter occurs on pages 75-78 where the author states that the British had around 750 men at the Arnhem road bridge. Yet earlier he had stated the Frost's battalion (the main unit at the bridge) had only 481 men and only two of his three companies (300-350 men) actually arrived at the bridge. Despite the author noting that other units later arrived at the bridge it is not completely clear where the additional 400 men came from.
In summary, if you have a high degree of interest in Market Garden this book may be useful to you in providing a more detailed account than is available in other works and by providing at least a little of the German viewpoint, but it is compromised by the lack of maps to support the text.
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