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Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War | 
 enlarge | Author: Robert A. Doughty
Publisher: Belknap Press
Category: Book
List Price: $24.95
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Avg. Customer Rating:  8 reviews
Sales Rank: 351782
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 592
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.6
Dimensions (in): 9 x 6.1 x 1.3
ISBN: 0674027264
Dewey Decimal Number: 940
EAN: 9780674027268
ASIN: 0674027264
Publication Date: March 31, 2008
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Product Description
As the driving force behind the Allied effort in World War I, France willingly shouldered the heaviest burden. In this masterful book, Robert Doughty explains how and why France assumed this role and offers new insights into French strategy and operational methods. French leaders, favoring a multi-front strategy, believed the Allies could maintain pressure on several fronts around the periphery of the German, Austrian, and Ottoman empires and eventually break the enemy's defenses. But France did not have sufficient resources to push the Germans back from the Western Front and attack elsewhere. The offensives they launched proved costly, and their tactical and operational methods ranged from remarkably effective to disastrously ineffective. Using extensive archival research, Doughty explains why France pursued a multi-front strategy and why it launched numerous operations as part of that strategy. He also casts new light on France's efforts to develop successful weapons and methods and the attempts to use them in operations. An unparalleled work in French or English literature on the war, Pyrrhic Victory is destined to become the standard account of the French army in the Great War. (20060505)
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Pyrrhic Victory: French Stategy and Operations in the Big War June 8, 2008
An excellent and very needed book in the English speaking world where so much of what we read and learn is from the British point of view with all the prejudices of the British thrown in. A valuable book for those who wish to get a more balanced view of the war by reading about both the British and the French. A caution, however, as one finds the british accounts onesided, there are moments in reading the book where i got the feeling the author was anti-British. But it doesn't detract from the overall excellence in providing a seldem heard aspect of the war.
The Agony of French Victory.... December 26, 2007
3 out of 3 found this review helpful
Robert Doughty's 2005 "Pyrrhic Victory" may be the most extensive English-language account available of Franch strategy and operations during the First World War. Doughty has combed a variety of archives to document that, contrary to popular myth, France sought throughout 1914-1918 to execute a coherent strategy of fighting a multi-front war in order to maintain pressure on Germany. Moreover, France executed this strategy despite increasing shortages of manpower, a ferocious battlefield learning curve for its general officers, and several crises of confidence.
France understood itself in 1914 to be at a distinct disadvantage in population and industrial base with respect to Germany. This disadvantage drove France to seek out allies throughout the war. France would rely on the huge but unsophisticated Russian Army to force Germany to fight a two-front war and on a reluctant Great Britain to help defend France itself.
In 1914, France and Britain narrowly avoided defeat in a war of movement that culminated in the miracle victory at the Battle of the Marne. As the Western Front stabilized into hundreds of kilometers of opposing trenches, France and its allies would spend the next four years trying to break the stalemate in France while applying pressure on German and its allies through operations in Turkey, the Balkans, Italy and Eastern Europe.
Doughty recounts the tense struggles between French civilian and military leaders over the best way to identify and carry out a winning strategy. The inability to impose a decisive battle on the Western Front in 1914 led to experimentation with siege tactics, renewed offensives in 1915, and a reluctant acceptance of a strategy of attrition by 1916. A premature return to a strategy of decisive battle in early 1917 nearly broke the French Army. France leaned heavily on the British Army to carry the load during much of 1917 while suppressing mutinies and scraping the bottom of its manpower barrel. Key changes in leadership, especially the elevation of Generals Petain and Foch, enabled France to ride out the supreme crisis of renewed German offensives in early 1918. The arrival in numbers of trained U.S. troops on the front lines by summer 1918 enabled the Allies to go over to the offensive and finally defeat an exhausted German Army.
Doughty's narrative makes clear what a close-run thing the Allied victory was. Despite a total nation effort to field and equip an enormous Army, France had been bled white by 1917 and was completely exhausted in the military sense by 1918. The maturation of a mass British Army on the continent, and the creation of a mass American Army in France, both events fostered by French leadership, enabled France to persevere to a pyrrhic victory that may have gutted its national resources and will for a generation.
"Pyrrhic Victory" is a scholarly work written perhaps as much for other scholars as for the general reader, who may find it a long dry effort at over 500 pages. Doughty has included some good maps; this reviewer wishes he had included a few more. Doughty's discussion of French strategy and operations might have included more commentary on corresponding German actions, making the external context of French actions a little clearer.
These minor criticisms aside, this is an exceptional work of military history, very highly recommended to students of the First World War, especially those seeking insight to evolving French strategy.
They Adapted and Overcame February 5, 2007
9 out of 9 found this review helpful
Despite the fact that the French Army carried the bulk of the Allied war effort on the Western Front in 1914-18, it has rarely received its due in First World War historiography. Brigadier General (ret.) Robert A. Doughty, head of West Point's history department for twenty years, seeks to correct that omission in his Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War. Overall, this is an erudite, well-written book for professional military officers and historians and an essential addition to any serious library on the First World War.
This book consists of ten chapters, with one on pre-war doctrine, eight that each cover about six months of the war and a conclusion. The initial chapter on transformation examines pre-war doctrine and strategic planning. Despite first-rate intelligence on German order of battle, the author notes that the French expected an invasion of Belgium but thought that the Germans lacked the reserves to make a deep penetration. The French Army was also fairly well equipped for war, but the neglect of heavy artillery was a serious omission. Furthermore, the author notes that initial combat on the borders indicated "the bankruptcy of French tactical doctrine and the inadequacy of their artillery," although these flaws were not immediately apparent to General Joffre, the French commander-in-chief. Indeed, the author paints a poor picture of Joffre in August 1914, as a commander who blamed others for his faulty operational plan, failed to concentrate his forces and ignored intelligence about enemy intentions. On the other hand, Joffre showed marked improvement in September 1914 by effectively utilizing France's railroads to mass forces for the Battle of the Marne - a victory which the author notes to Joffre's credit.
Once the war shifted to a static phase in 1915, the author notes that the French failure to defend vital coal and steel regions at the start of the war hindered their long-term war industrial potential. It is not uncommon that military men ignore economic factors until they are faced with shortages. As the French Army gradually shifted to an offensive strategy in 1915, the author describes how Joffre succeeded in creating a substantial reserve force but that the early attacks were costly failures due to limited artillery support. Two competing offensive doctrines emerged: Joffre's "continuous battle," which envisaged a massive `big push' style attack, and the "methodical battle" advocated by younger generals such as Foch and Petain. While Joffre believed that a decisive breakthrough on the Western Front was possible, more realistic officers such as Petain realized that it was no longer possible and that the conflict had become a war of attrition. However, Joffre set the strategic agenda well into 1916 and he adamantly opposed diversions such as operations in the Mediterranean that took troops away from his `big push' offensives on the Western Front. It was not until near-disaster at Verdun that Joffre realized the demands of attrition warfare and promoted defense-in-depth against German counterattacks. Also, by 1916 the French Army had finally corrected its deficiencies in heavy artillery, which transformed its operational potential. Yet unlike Germany, France did not opt for total war as Germany did, with its political leaders placing limits on bombing German cities and the use of chemical warfare.
By the end of 1916, French officers such as Nivelle, Petain and Foch had developed new methods of infantry-artillery coordination that enabled the French Army to launch short, but effective attacks. Nivelle became a little too enamored of these new tactics and when he replaced Joffre, he attempted to use them to achieve a major breakthrough in the ill-fated Nivelle offensive. The mutiny that resulted from Nivelle's poor judgment nearly broke the French Army, but it was Petain that saved it from dissolution. Petain adopted a new program for the army that emphasized material over haphazard use of infantry and this program emphasized aircraft, heavy artillery, tanks and chemicals. Ultimately, Petain found the material key to victory but it was Foch - who finally became the unified commander of Allied forces in the desperate days of 1918 - who found the morale key to victory.
Pyrrhic Victory also offers readers a very different perspective on British actions. From the French perspective, the BEF was not pulling its fair share of the load in 1914-15 and British offensives were rather puny. While the author does not denigrate the British, Belgian or American contributions to victory, this book helps to illuminate the major role played by the French in achieving that victory. Although starting out wrong-footed, the French Army survived a major offensive by one of the best armies in the world, adapted and eventually developed the means to push that enemy off its soil. While the price of victory was crippling, there is no doubt that the French Army in the First World did far more than merely `survive' until the Americans came to `rescue them.'
A new look at WW1 August 6, 2006
28 out of 29 found this review helpful
Most histories of the First World War have focused on the British or German perspective. This is a history of the French operations, which provided the bulk of the resistance to the Germans on the western front.
Histories of the First World War suffered from partisan books written directly after the war that gave a caricatured version of operations. They suggested that French and British generals failed to appreciate the impact of modern technology and simply used men as cannon fodder. This book is one that seeks to counter that view and show how the French commanders reacted to the success and failure of operations and developed strategies which evolved during the war to lessen the loss of human life and develop more efficient methods of attack and defence. In fact the year of 1914 saw one of the French Armies considerable triumphs the defeat of the German movement through Belgium aimed at outflanking the French line. This success occurred when the Germans devoted the majority of their army to the western front in an attempt to gain an early victory. England at the time had only mobilised a small army so the defeat of the Germans was a remarkable victory.
One of the interesting points made by the book is that some 50% of the French losses occurred in the first year of the war before the development of the trench system. The reason of course was that before the development of the trenches when there was the war of movement infantry were much more vulnerable to artillery fire. In 1915 when the French attacked again and again in an attempt to aid the Russian offensives the losses were although substantial far less than in the disastrous first year. The losses suffered in resisting the German offensive at Verdun again were again less than in 1915. It was only in 1918 that France carried out the series of attacks that finally led to Germany's capitulation that the casualty figures increased to levels close to 1915.
The book is interesting as it shows how the French developed tactics over time. The rolling barrage to protect the infantry in its advance. The notion of the flexible defence so that infantry was kept away from the front line to avoid the heavy losses which resulted from opening barrages and instead using counter attacks and the holding of key points to inflict casualties on the attacker.
In fact it is clear that the French became frustrated with the English under Haig who launched his Somme offensive without using the sorts of advances in strategy that had been developed by the French and Germans thus turning that battle into a costly stalemate. One of the attractions of the book is that it shows the history of the English campaign and issues though an observers eyes.
The book also reveals how close the Germans came to victory in 1918. If Ludendorff had been able to move more quickly to separate the English and French armies in detail he could have won. Instead he relied on costly staged offensives delayed so much that the French and English were able to hang on.
Despite the loss of the major industrial section of their country the French were able to turn their country into an arsenal producing of the weapons that were used by the Americans. Huge numbers of tanks aircraft and heavy artillery.
The book also shows clearly the importance of the operations in Macedonian in hastening the end of the war. The attack on this front in `1918 led to Bulgaria being forced out of the war. This broke the German supply line to Turkey which meant that the British under Allenby were able to advance from Egypt easily also defeating that country. Lastly the surrender of Bulgaria opened up yet another front that the weakened Austro-Hungarian Empire could not hold. One of the more interesting books on the First World War which is valuable in giving another perspective on the conflict.
An essential and understudies topic June 1, 2006
7 out of 11 found this review helpful
As has been noted there are a rash of english language books on the Anglo and American participation of the war. The battle of the Somme and the 1918 offensive are covered in detail in most books on the war. Anyone with a serious interest knows about the destruction of the British regular army and England's officer class. We read about the war at sea because of England's involvement.
Few books have concentrated on the French aspect except to mention the Mutiny's, the miracle of 1914 and of course the mention the damage done to the French nation by the death of so many Frenchmen.
THis book is parhaps one of a kind then because it gives the English language reader insight into the French strategy. Mostly a strategy that hs been mocked or passed over. Most have viewed the 1917 offensive as one more ill-concevied blood bath leading directly to mutiny. Many know about Verdun, however the rest of the front, some 70% of it was manned by Frenchmen. The French army shared the burden of the war on the western front. Here we are given a fuller picture of the french general staff, of Foch and Petain and of the french strategy in more minute detail. Keegan and others have done wonderful books on WWI, the more specific study will sppeal to those with a genuine interest in the period. A worthwhile read.
Seth J. Frantzman
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