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Strategy: Second Revised Edition (Meridian) | 
 enlarge | Author: B. H. Liddell Hart
Publisher: Plume
Category: Book
List Price: $18.00
Buy Used: $4.24
You Save: $13.76 (76%)
New (28) Used (31) Collectible (3) from $4.24
Avg. Customer Rating:  46 reviews
Sales Rank: 39276
Media: Paperback
Edition: 2 Revised
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 448
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.7
Dimensions (in): 7.8 x 5.3 x 1.1
ISBN: 0452010713
Dewey Decimal Number: 355.4
EAN: 9780452010710
ASIN: 0452010713
Publication Date: March 30, 1991
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Book Description
This is the classic book on war as we know it. During his long life, Basil H. Liddell Hart was considered one of the world's foremost military thinkers--a man generally regarded as the "Clausewitz of the 20th century." Liddell Hart stressed movement, flexibilty, surprise. He saw that in most military campaigns dislocation of the enemy's psychological and physical balance is prelude to victory. This dislocation results from a strategic indirect approach. Reflect for a moment on the results of direct confrontation (trench war in WW I) versus indirect dislocation (Blitzkreig in WW II). Liddell Hart is also tonic for business and political planning: just change the vocabulary and his concepts fit. "The most important book by one of the outstanding military authorities of our time." (Library Journal)
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| Customer Reviews: Read 41 more reviews...
 Modern Classic May 10, 2008
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Though I am not sold on Liddell Hart's thesis in this book, it provides such an expansive analysis of historical military accounts that I cannot discount its indelible mark on my future thoughts of military strategy. Clausewitz puts me to sleep, but Liddell Hart kept me awake into the wee hours of the morning. This is recommended to anyone seeking even a minimum knowledge in military strategy. Strapped for time? Read the introductory chapters and skip to the final chapters where Liddell Hart expounds upon his thesis (having spent the majority of the book providing countless analyses of historical examples).
Strategy Classic April 28, 2008
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
I bought this book to replace the one I'd had with me since I first bought in while in the Marine Corps. This book can be enjoyed on two levels. The first is its intended insight into what makes for successful strategy - "the indirect approach". The second is for the history of warfare over the some 3,000 years. Unlike other similar book with similar topics, this one has had me going back to it over and over again. Liddell Hart effectively outlined the situation the world finds itself in today. Small unit tactics driving whole world strategy. You may read "The Art of War" for fundamentals, but you need to read this book for the execution.
 oversimplified view, but worked well nonetheless March 5, 2008
1 out of 2 found this review helpful
The author always assumes that you are smarter than your opponent. The main rules are "attack your opponent where he least expects", "trick your opponent so that he falling into your trap", and so on.
What if the enemy is just as smart as you are, or at least follows the advice from the same book? Most of the book's recommendations are no longer valid in that case. For instance, it's no longer true that you always want to attack where the enemy least expects you (Nash's theory explains that issue on an abstact-theoretical level). Some advice still holds; for instance, you should indeed attack in a way that threatens multiple enemy objectives, leaving the enemy guessing for as long as possible.
But overall, a strategy book that is completely based on the stupidity of the enemy is quite weak, in my opinion. Furthermore many examples in the book are one-sided, usually blaming the losing side without truly explaining their choices and reasoning very well.
Nevertheless, the book's advice worked very well as recently as mid-20th century. Famous generals from the Allies and Axis forces, as well as from post-war Israel, have successfully used and highly praised this book. Apparently, many times in history the enemy was easy to trick, due to stupidity, or arrogance, or political pressure.
It's hard to rate this book. I'd give it 2 stars as a modern strategy text, and 5+ stars as a practical advice for contemporary military leaders (but which is only of historical interest today).
Not historically objective September 7, 2007
4 out of 4 found this review helpful
Liddell-Hart's magnum-opus, "Strategy", purports to demonstrate that "throughout the ages, effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent's unreadiness to meet it." In short, his book is predicated on the notions that an indirect strategy is the only strategy which succeeds, and that history shows this to be the truth.
"Strategy" is impressive in its scope, and it contains much of value for the student of military history; however its content is not objective. Liddell-Hart interprets events to support his thesis regarding the superiority of the indirect approach. One instance of such interpretation is his discussion of the Allied landings at Normandy in June 1944. Liddell Hart correctly describes the theater strategic decision to land in the Normandy region vice landing in the vicinity of Pas de Calais as a variation of the indirect approach, in which allied planners demonstrated "an inclination to avoid the most strongly defended approach" (p 296), but he fails to address the fact that an invasion of Northwest Europe to defeat Nazi German was in itself a strategic direct approach. The Allies' Mediterranean strategy had succeeded against Axis forces and protected British access to the Suez Canal; however it did not strike a decisive blow. Rather, it contracted German forces into a denser defensive posture on the mainland of Europe, requiring a direct assault on the defenses of the Atlantic Wall in preparation for the drive into Germany.
Clausewitz wrote, "if...some historical event is being presented in order to demonstrate a general truth, care must be taken that every aspect bearing on the truth at issue is fully and circumstantially developed." Liddell Hart sought to raise the efficacy of the indirect approach to the status of a general truth, but in the process of doing so failed to consider all aspects of his argument. This failure leaves his work ultimately unconvincing and thereby demonstrates the utility of Clausewitz's admonition to be thorough when using history to illustrate theory.
The Optimistic Jew August 31, 2007
0 out of 3 found this review helpful
Liddell Hart was considered one of the world's foremost military thinkers of the 20th century. I consider him to be the fundamental thinker for policy making. His clear definitions of the differences between ideology, policy, grand-strategy, strategy, tactics and operations must be the methodological framework for national policy. His military thinking had great influence on the Israeli army. He was a champion of indirect dislocation and condemned direct confrontation. This along with his concepts of the "strategy of the indirect approach" and a "policy of limited aims" served Israel well in its early years. Rejection of this philosophy following the Six Day War has caused untold mischief to the Zionist Enterprise -- a point I make over and over again in my own book "The Optimistic Jew: a Positive Vision for the Jewish People in the 21st Century". I would make Liddell Hart's book required reading for anyone who presumes to make Jewish policy of any sort.
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