War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 | 
 enlarge | Author: Edward S. Miller
Publisher: US Naval Institute Press
Category: Book
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Avg. Customer Rating:  13 reviews
Sales Rank: 124683
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 560
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.6
Dimensions (in): 8.7 x 5.9 x 1.4
ISBN: 1591145007
Dewey Decimal Number: 355
EAN: 9781591145004
ASIN: 1591145007
Publication Date: March 30, 2007
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Product Description
Based on twenty years of research in formerly secret archives, this book reveals for the first time the full significance of War Plan Orange--the U.S. Navy's strategy to defeat Japan, forumulated over the forty years prior to World War II. It recounts the struggles between "thrusting" and "cautionary" schools of strategy, the roles of outspoken leaders such as Dewey, Mahan, King, and MacArthur, and the adaptation of aviation and other technologies to the plan. The book shows that the strategy of Plan Orange was the basis of prewar U.S. naval development in training, ship and aircraft design, and amphibious and tactical thought. War Plan Orange is the recipient of numerous book awards, including the prestigious Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt Naval History Prize.
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A Must Read July 27, 2008
11 out of 11 found this review helpful
Author Miller has justly received many honors for this book which present the US planning for response to any Japanese aggression against the United States during the period between World War I and World War II. Miller also wrote another book, "Bankrupting The Enemy" about the US economic actions concerning Japan leading up to the war that is equally high quality and required reading for World War II historians.
Outside of the plans themselves representing various schools of thought among Naval strategists, thrusters, defensivists, cautionaries, etc., the political situations in the United States with respect to limitations on military capabilities are covered thoroughly. Often the planning foundered on the reality of inadequate resources, rendering official strategy rather feckless in hindsight. Politicials were simply not up to the task of providing military preparedness, and it was not until Roosevelt was able to obtain a major naval expansion through Congress in 1937 that sufficient force would be available for a strategy for victory starting as early as 1943.
Although the author makes the case that the Rainbow-5, the last pre-war Plan Orange, was followed in the main to victory, the most disturbing element was the sacrifice of the Philippines inherent in the planning but not communicated to MacArthur or the officers or men in the Philippines. Troops were sent to the Philippines to sacrifice themselves, unbeknownst to them. Plans to relieve the Philippines were simply not realistic given the resources of the Navy, even if there had been no losses at Pearl Harbor. This is clear from Miller's book, and an indictment of the American arm-chair admirals, generals and politicians involved. This lesson went unlearned for the future, as the Army's Berlin Brigade was defenseless throughout the Cold War, and truthfully its only purpose was to die so that American public opinion could be mobilized against the Soviets.
One is ultimately led to the conclusion that War Plan Orange was successful more due to the limited options available to the planners than to any inherent brilliance in planning. The adjustments during the War such as invading the Marianas to supply a long-range bombing base tended to be more decisive than the pre-war plans. Nonetheless, Rainbow-5 provided an effective starting point and should not be underestimated.
A side point is that the author apparently does not believe that Truman would have invaded Japan if there had been no atomic bomb. As he writes, "... it is questionable that after 292,000 American deaths in all theaters of World War II, any president would have accepted carnage on that scale (of the invasion) as the only option for ending the war." Interesting point. I guess the belief the the American public can't sacrifice or has limited staying power in a conflict is alive and well. Maybe even true.
superb May 30, 2008
1 out of 2 found this review helpful
This was a superb book, well researched and well written, a fascinating story, and a valuable contribution to the political and military literature on the Pacific war, from Mahan to the outbreak of hostilities. "Orange" was the code word for Japan; the presumed cause for war with Japan was assumed to be the seizure of the Phillipines by Japan, something that had become an American fear within a short time of annexation. WPO was the plan of the American response. Over time, between the comings and goings of different staffs and factions, a vision of a Pacific War developed that comprehended the strategy and the operational needs of a Pacific campaign - fleets leapfrogging from base to base across the Pacific; mobile bases and a vast fleet train; base construction forces; amphibious forces with organic air assets - a view, adaptable to circumstances, of how to fight a vast war of movement and attrition across the Pacific basin, and a view that doomed any US forces stationed in the Phillipines and on Guam.
Must Read for WW II Info (Pacific) May 9, 2008
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
War Plan Orange is one of the best books on background to WW II in the Pacific Theater of war. Simply put, War Plan Orange is the blueprint the US used to win the war with Japan. Other plans could have been used that may have led to disaster, but the adoption of War Plan Orange was the key to victory in the Pacific. The Plan predicted the course of the war with great accuracy, and one must read this book to understand how that accuracy was obtained.
The book starts with an overview of the plan and its development from 1906 forward. Then a chapter is devoted to each aspect of the plan; for example, one chapter focuses on the aggressive plans desired by charismatic admirals and another chapter talks about the conservative plans developed by staff and demanded by Congress because of budget constraints. How this clash of plans was reconciled is a most interesting story.
The writing is clear and concise. Each chapter is finely focused. The various personalities and their impact on the plan are thoroughly discussed. The budgetary constraints are laid out as a key part of the planning process. Overall, the development of the plan and its impact on the war in the Pacific are described well.
Anyone who is interested in the Pacific war or WW II must read War Plan Orange. It is an easy fast read and will enhance one's knowledge of the war and of American war planning as few other books can.
AD2
 Filling in the Blanks September 1, 2007
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Wartime policy in the Pacific was always a mystery to me. Miller's book allowed to make some sense of locations and campaigns, that these were not chosen at random or on the fly. A complementary work to such modern classics as At Dawn We Slept.
Research at its best. August 14, 2007
7 out of 8 found this review helpful
War Plan Orange dispels many of the myths surrounding a supposed plan for an Armageddon type clash between the Navies of the USA and Japan before WW2 actually broke out.
The Author is a little confusing at first. He has a tendency to leap from this year to that, then back to here and over to there, with a side reference to some other period. There were sections of the first few chapters where I was not sure if I was in the right time continuum. However he eventually settles down about half way through, after which things proceed in a far more orderly cronological order.
That is not to say valuable information in the first half, is not able to be gleaned from this excellent work. It can be. You just might need to keep reminding yourself which year he is currently addressing.
Over all the author tells a story of contingency planning. All nations engage in it just in case something happens. It also enables naval planners to determine the sort of ships required in the event of a future naval conflict.
While the contingencies are often battered about by different lines of thought from a whole range of naval people as the years progress, one thing is clear. The US Navy worked out what their likely requirements were if Government sent them to war. This came in the form of permanent bases, advanced base equipment, ships and stores. But these issues then also required a means by which to deploy those things and where.
The author has done some incredible research and unearthed volumes of reports that must have been gathering dust for decades.
In doing so he shows how a navy goes about planning for what might be required of it. Even when peace reigns, these things have to be allowed for, but the longer it reigns, the more people get to effect the plan. Yet over all, the things they forsee, and the plans they make, do in many cases, turn WW2 in the Pacific into an emulation of what these men had thought out during previous decades.
Cleverly, the author concentrates on the US Navy. There are no side distractions into what the Japanese thought. Even when it turns into plan Rainbow to reflect more countries involved, plus allies, he remains true to his course. Therefore, although armed with 'hindsight', the reader finds himself in the position of the planners as they must have wondered, what the other side were wondering. We know what eventually happened. We do not know from this book, how the Japanese side of it was planned. So the reader is as in the dark as the planners were, which I felt produced a good element into the study of this particular part of history.
The book is strongly recommended for any naval historian, or indeed any historian looking at the land side of the Pacific war. For those who like a bit of lighter reading, it may prove a bit too heavy. But I would still advise those with an interest in WW2 in the Pacific, to give it a try. You will find it incredibly informative.
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