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Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Modern War Studies) | 
 enlarge | Author: Shu Guang Zhang
Publisher: University Press Of Kansas
Category: Book
List Price: $49.95
Buy New: $40.99
You Save: $8.96 (18%)
New (18) Used (8) from $40.99
Avg. Customer Rating:  2 reviews
Sales Rank: 418241
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 356
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.5
Dimensions (in): 9.4 x 6.4 x 1.3
ISBN: 0700607234
Dewey Decimal Number: 951.9042
EAN: 9780700607235
ASIN: 0700607234
Publication Date: December 1, 1995
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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| Editorial Reviews:
Product Description
This is the first English-language military history of what the People's Republic of China called the "War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea." Based upon a vast array of recently available Chinese sources, it provides a revealing new look at the far-reaching influence of Mao Zedong's political and military thought on China's conduct of the war. As Shu Guang Zhang reminds us, many observers in 1950 thought it foolhardy for this young and underdeveloped communist nation to engage in yet another war. Coming so soon after its costly civil war with the Nationalists, the Korean crisis presented China with the uninviting prospect of fighting a technologically superior (and nuclear-armed) opponent on foreign terrain. Mao, however, was convinced from more than a decade of fighting against the Japanese and the Nationalists that political gain and warfare were inseparable. ("Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," he'd declared as early as 1927.) Zhang argues that war in Korea offered Mao yet another opportunity to expand and consolidate his political power at home, while at the same time uniting the Chinese proletariat against Yankee imperialism and proving to the international community that China had arrived as a major world power. As Zhang shows, Mao's decision to go to war against the United States was guided by a devoutly romantic belief that human forces would always triumph over modern technology. Victory, according to Mao, did not necessarily go to those who had bigger and better guns. It was reserved instead for those who possessed an unwavering commitment to a superior cause. Merging the martial thought of both Clausewitz and Sun-Tze with Marx's concept of classstruggle, Mao galvanized China's military and citizenry at every level to fight a people's war against Yankee imperialism. Fueled by Mao's call to safeguard China and East Asia from American invasions, the Chinese showed how a relatively outgunned but inspired fighting force could deprive a technologically superior opponent of victory in a limited war. As Zhang concludes, subsequent conflicts in Vietnam and elsewhere have proven the value of that lesson.
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| Customer Reviews:
 Insights into Mao's military thinking April 24, 2003
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
Along with Jian Chen 1994 book on what drew Communist China into the Korean conflict, Prof. Zhang's book provides valuable insights on how Mao and the PLA "volunteer" army conducts its warfare against the much better equipped U.S. military. Red China paid a very high price to defend the North Koreans, and Prof. Chen explores the root motivation for this "sacrifice." Prof. Zhang's book focuses on the how of the war, from the Chinese view point. Working with previously classified Chinese documents, the book details how Mao and his military commanders (led by Peng Te-huai, who was purged three years after the Armstice) differed on the strategies and tactics, with Mao coming across as an incompetent bureaucrat who placed zero value on the lives of his soldiers. While there are many mistakes in this book concerning the movements of the U.S. forces (likely because Prof. Zhang is quoting from Chinese military memos -- but it would have been nice if he caught them and corrected them), this book is a must-read for every American who has not forgotten the Forgotten War and the hundreds of thousands of U.S. casualties.
 A Marine who was there May 30, 2000
2 out of 4 found this review helpful
Shu Guang Zhang provides an in depth perspective to the Chinese motivation for intervention in the Korean War, and a critical analysis of the strategy employed. Much can be learned of the battlefield strategy and political machinations of this most formitable foe, including the tactics of both the battlefield and the negotiation table.
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