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US World War II and Korean War Field Fortifications 1941-53 (Fortress) | 
 enlarge | Author: Gordon Rottman
Creator: Ian Palmer
Publisher: Osprey Publishing
Category: Book
List Price: $16.95
Buy New: $1.72
You Save: $15.23 (90%)
New (37) Used (10) from $1.72
Avg. Customer Rating:  1 reviews
Sales Rank: 387686
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 64
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.4
Dimensions (in): 9.6 x 7 x 0.3
ISBN: 184176812X
Dewey Decimal Number: 623.15
EAN: 9781841768120
ASIN: 184176812X
Publication Date: April 12, 2005
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Product Description
The US Army and Marine Corps in World War II considered themselves highly mobile, offensive forces. Their mobile-warfare doctrine envisioned field fortifications and obstacles as temporary in nature. As a result, their design was simple and made use of local materials, and they could be constructed comparatively quickly, whilst still providing adequate protection. By the time of the Korean War, only minor changes had been made to field fortification construction and layout, and to small-unit organization, weapons, and tactics. This title addresses field fortifications built by US infantrymen during World War II and in Korea, and covers rifle-platoon positions, trenches, crew-served weapon positions, bunkers, dugouts, shelters, observation posts and anti-tank obstacles.
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| Customer Reviews:
Both doctrine and practice covered--with the "official" omissions included February 8, 2006
3 out of 3 found this review helpful
This Osprey Fortress-series book covers both doctrine and practice. It is often said that the infantryman uses his E-tool more often than his rifle. Illustrator Ian Palmer depicted company and battalion defensive positions, as well as details on individual positions for riflemen and heavy weapons. Some of these illustrations are the same ones used in US Army field manuals (both War Department and the modern Department of Defense). Tables and sidebars give such important information as unit frontages, amount of materials required for protection, equipment allocated for infantry units constructing field fortifications, and weapon ranges. One item often left out of the official field manuals is the weapons' transverse and elevation limits-so I cannot fault Gordon L. Rottman for not including these tables in US World War II and Korean War Field Fortifications 1941-53. During my 24 years in uniform, I ran into company and battalion leaders with infantry experience who still didn't know that the T&E for the M60 was only plus or minus 400 mils (covering 800 meters at 1000 meters distance); this was important because they treated weapon positions as if each one had 360-degree fields of fire with full elevation to cover every inch of ground. Rottman's text and Palmer's images show the battlefield obstacles used to deny enemy access to these weapon dead-spaces (places where weapon fires couldn't reach)-though land mines (classified as "obstacles" by American doctrine) are not detailed in this thin volume. That is a flaw shared by the official DoD US Army Field Manuals covering field fortifications-land mines and demolitions are covered in another FM. Besides, there might be some official displeasure at providing "terrorist bomb manuals" to the general public by publishing literature on mine warfare.
I cannot fault the paucity of communications coverage in US World War II and Korean War Field Fortifications 1941-53, even though that is an important part of the defense and even though both WWII and Korean War accounts by the low-ranking soldiers are replete with laying and repairing field telephone wires-the official manuals don't cover communications very well because there are separate field manual and technical manual (FM and TM) libraries on the subject. On the other hand, communications knits together the defense. Infantry combat is a team sport requiring coordinated effort-not an individual competition. Field telephones, radios, pyrotechnics, whistles, bugles, sirens, arm and hand signals, and the Mark One Leather Lung are as important as sand bags and the entrenching tool for the defense. Without communications, the command post was a waste of time-the command post served as a communications center for the platoon, company, battalion, or regiment on the line.
Listening posts (LP) and observation posts (OP) are mentioned and their placement and construction explained. LP's and OP's exist to provide as much advance warning as possible. They are the entrenched commander's primary combat information tool, with his own local combat and recon patrols being secondary (never enough people to do everything-and in Korea, sometimes patrols were prohibited to "encourage" the Chinese to come to the peace table...) LP's and OP's, along with troops in the trenches and "foxholes" along the front line, were supposed to have communications with the command post-otherwise, putting your boys in harms way was futile.
Lots of people who should know better criticize the "World War One trench warfare" tactics-while praising the enemy forces' use of field fortifications or even permanent fortifications as progressive. Rottman's book covers the evolution of American (the Marines used the same doctrine) field fortification theory and practice during World War Two and the Korean War. I like this book and even though modern US Army field fortification doctrine has changed, the drawings and illustrations and text would permit me to instruct leaders and junior soldiers in the practice of field fortification. Communications trenches are vital even today in Iraq and Afghanistan because of random mortar and rocket attacks. Yes, fortifications protect against the Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED: aka "car bomb" or "truck bomb") and suicide bomber wearing an explosive vest the same way that they protected my WWII and Korean War predecessors from tank attack, artillery shells, and infantry weaponry. Actually, in World War Two there were Japanese suicide bombers. Korean War vets tell me of Communist suicide bombers as well. Though these suicide attackers didn't get mentioned in Rottman's useful index, the illustrations show how interlocking fields of fire was intended to provide a leak-proof defense. Combat is dangerous and attrition is expected-interlocking fields of fire not only catches attackers in a cross-fire, but in the event that one or more crew served weapon or individual rifleman fighting positions are destroyed, overlapping fields of fire provide uninterrupted coverage. Sometimes.
The neat photographs and illustrations may give a false impression of defensive fortifications as static and passive. Effective defense positions are elastic-Rottman's text mentions secondary and alternate defensive positions. The ability of the rifle platoons to launch counter attacks or even conduct offensive operations using their "trench line" as a fire support base was considered in the design and construction of fortified positions. Usually.
I recommend US World War II and Korean War Field Fortifications 1941-53 become part of the library for the amateur WWII historian, for the modeler as a guide to dioramas, and for the war gamer. It does have application for the modern soldier, too, in the absence of current training materials.
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