Korea: The First War We Lost

Bevin Alexander's book suffers from too much of a good thing-organization. 492 pages are divided into 63 chapters. Each chapter identifies a good point, but in trying to cover all of them, the book develops few of them sufficiently. Instead, Alexander skips from idea to idea, devoting fewer than ten pages, and then flits off to the next idea.

The scope of his topic, from the bowels of the White House and Pentagon to the nameless ridges and valleys of Korea, is immense. In trying to cover it all, he has instead touched only the "wavetops." At the end of the book, after following the trail of policy decisions, Alexander fails to present a cogent, convincing argument that the US and her UN coalition partners indeed lost this war. The (final) stated war aim was to restore South Korea's sovereignty, and that was accomplished. I think that Alexander implicitly accepts MacArthur's statement that there is no substitute for victory, and no such thing as a war for limited objectives. While the first part is true, victory is defined by the use of military means to accomplish political objectives, and in Korea, the US and UN coalition succeeded.

The strongest theme in the book is the identification of the policy struggles between the new National Command Authorities, National Security Advisor, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander in Chief, Far East. Alexander does a solid job of defining the problem in terms of positions and policy, rather than the normal MacArthur versus Truman debate. He also explores the impact of MacArthur's seniority relative to the Joint Chiefs (MacArthur was the only active five star general).

Another strength of the book is its maps. Since (usually) authors have to pay for whatever maps they want included in a book, most include as few as possible. Alexander includes fourteen, most of them tactical level maps. Building off of the maps, the chapters that deal with separate battles are solid. The weakness is that Alexander fails top explain the operational integration of a series of battles into a campaign designed to accomplish strategic objectives.

If you are already familiar with the Korean War, this book can serve as an interesting read for a new look at the integration of the strategic aims with the daily battle plan, and a revealing look at the difficulty of making defense and foreign policy since 1947. If, however, you are looking for a one volume single read introit to the subject, this is not the book to read.


A seminal contribution to American military studies   February 14, 2001
 3 out of 3 found this review helpful

In a newly revised edition, Bevin Alexander's Korea: The First War We Lost continues to be an exhaustive, scholarly exploration of the causes and effects of American involvement in the Korean War. Alexander, a combat historian during the Korean War and commander of the 5th Historical Detachment, points out the U.S. succeeded in stopping North Korean aggression, but failed in its attempt to destroy the North Korean state and eliminate this strategic shield protecting China's heartland. Alexander's informative and comprehensive text is enhanced with thirteen maps and is a seminal contribution to American military studies in general, and the Korean conflict in particular.


Excellent Meld of Military and Political Aspects of the War   August 19, 2000
MY GOODNESS, I HAVE JUST read three Korean War books in a row. Completing the hat trick is Alexander's book. Don't judge the book by its title: there is a fair compendium of the facts (and fantasies) of all the Korean War participants: China, Russia, NKPA and ROK forces, the UN, the US and affiliated armies all swung from victory to defeat; wild bouts of optimism and valleys of despair. Perhaps it is fitting that this country of Morning Calm and intense moods; of vertical ridges and sprawling mud flats, should so condemn those who set foot on its rich and fragrant soils. Do not make Alexander's book the first book you read about the Korean War. Read Appleman, Knox and perhaps Acheson first. Then Alexander's mastery of the war and its complex web of intrigue (NY to Seoul; Beijing to Moscow; London to Delhi) in the high courts of the nascent cold war will hit you hardest where it should: right in the heart. When you count the staggering loss of life-especially in the two years the negotiations dragged on, a delay Alexander rightly blames largely on the USA-and realize they were spent to capture worthless ridges, I doubt tears won't come to your eyes. What a pathetic account Truman and Acheson make of themselves, even if many decisions they reached had merit.
Alexander's grasp of history here is very insightful. He claims that it is our obsession with 'total victory' over Japan in WWII that allowed the Russians to enter the Asian war and led to the division of the Korean peninsula in the first place.
So too is the author's discussion of NKPA actions off the main Seoul/Taejon/Taegu battle axis. If NKPA forces had not dilly dallied in the west (defending ports the UN never attempted to regain) and on the east coast (deploying in the mountains to prevent ambushes, which also never came), they would have crushed the still weak Pusan defenses weeks before a perimeter could be established.
Few books mix politics with military analysis. Even fewer do it well, and Alexander's is one of them. He breaks the diplomatic/political initiatives into tangible issues. While intelligent and analytic, he remains youthful in his comments: "One can only imagine the dispatches that transpired between Moscow and Ambassador Jacob Malik!" The photo of the Russian diplomat's vacant chair at the Security Council meeting is a Korean War icon. To right wingers, an appropriate metaphor for what communist state-ism would always be: empty.

While other analyses (In'chon, Chosin, the decision to cross the parallel) and conclusions (that the US was an aggressor! for going into North Korea) are more suspect, they do not detract from the book.