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 Encyclopedia Espionagia November 13, 2008
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
This is a massive book. In its hardbound edition, there are 541 pages of text and another 130 pages of citations, translations, abbreviations, notes, bibliography and index. This book, published in 1978, stands worthily beside the author's earlier and better known book, "The Codebreakers."
The book's title, "Hitler's Spies", however, is a bit misleading. David Kahn has this to say about the book in his preface: "The study would encompass not just spies but all forms of information gathering.... It would base itself not on the writings of other authors on intelligence, but on primary sources. And it would not stop with the intelligence coups, but would complete the story by telling how the information was used--or not used by the generals." [Page ix, 1978 hardbound edition.]
A little later, he adds, "In a more general sense, what has emerged is a picture of Hitler's intelligence apparatus and its results. Or, in other words, the information-gathering mechanism of an entire nation. No one seems to have done this before (and now that I've finished, I know why.)" [Page xi.]
That is what the author tells us the book is. What the book emphatically is not, is a linear narrative of Hitler's spies or of Hitler's intelligence apparatus and its results or even of the information-gathering mechanism of an entire nation. No, what we find here is something that has the look and feel and heft of an encyclopedia on the German spies/apparatus/mechanism of the National Socialist era. The book consists of 27 chapters, each serving as a longish article on some specific sub-area of the general topic:
~ Chapter 5 The Military Attache
~ Chapter 8 The World from the Sky
~ Chapter 9 Questioning the Foe
~ Chapter 12 Hearing Diplomats Chatter
~ Chapter 15 The Admiral and His Abwehr
~ Chapter 24 The Greatest Mistake
~ Chapter 25 The Biggest Surprise
In the nature of things, some parts of this book plod on very like the governmental and military after-action reports with which I have some familiarity. Other parts offer interesting or amusing anecdotes, such as this one about eavesdropping on the supposedly scrambled trans-Atlantic telephone calls of some VERY high-ranking people:
"...Churchill and Roosevelt were not always are careful as they should have been. Churchill was practically addicted to the telephone, picking it up at all hours of the day and night to call Roosevelt, who in his turn surprised the Germans with his indiscretions. He, Churchill, and a few other high officials were not given warnings about insecurity that the lower officials were--an. indication to the Germans, when this was omitted, that an important person was coming on the line."[! Page 175.]
Even though history has progressed in its habitual way and new sources of information have become available, as a compendium, as a source book--if not as a narrative--"Hitler's Spies" remains invaluable to anyone with interest in or concerns about German intelligence during the Second World War.
Of course, the book shares some inevitable flaws with all encyclopedias: large as it is, it cannot possibly contain every detail on every subject; and wide-ranging though it may be, it cannot ride each and every hobby horse beloved by each and every possible reviewer. Forget about such quibbles, to my knowledge, at least, there is nothing available to the public that matches it.
Five stars.
Review July 26, 2008
This book could also have been subtitled "The Encyclopedia of German WWII Intelligence." The author not only knows the subject but can actually write entertaining sentences. While this may be a problem for some, I actually like it. I did not want an academic volume. I wanted to know a history of German intelligence.
The book, much to my surprise, even covered the German army recon tactics. It is a good read. I also thought the line drawings were a nice addition although they seemed somewhat an after thought. Never the less a nice general introduction to a wide ranging subject. If you were expecting more detail, especially of cypher, than you probably won't like it as much.
 Interesting book, could have been better April 5, 2008
This book gives a detailed look into how German intelligence agencies largely failed in WW2. Much information is given, but some significant information seems to be missing or sketchy at best. The author attributes the German failures to the historical legacy of being an agressive continental power that placed less importance on intelligence for offensive operations than for defence, and on national arrogance. Another factor was Hitler's multiplication of agencies so as to divide and rule his underlings.
But, it seems to me that the author's concentration on these specific factors caused him to ignore some significant incidents and factors. For example, he does not mention that Canaris warned Franco that Germany was bound to lose the war, and that Germany could not supply coastal artillery to Spain. This caused Franco to scotch any moves against Gibraltar. Kahn mentions the result, but not the role of Canaris, why?
The author's treatment of Heydrich also seems to be off-key. He does not address the thesis that Heydrich's assasination was more of a British project than a Czech project motivated more by (1) Heydrich's success rather than his unpopularity, and (2) the prospect of Heydrich's move to Paris causing the complete destruction of the French resistance.
Because of the information in the book that might be hard to find elsewhere - 4 stars. Because of the obvious blind spots, and relentless agenda pushing - no fifth star.
A Milestone May 5, 2006
The author has written two seminal works: Hitlers Spies and The Codebreakers. Both are among the most informative and best written books on intelligence produced to date. Hitler's Spies goes through the convaluted Nazi intelligence community organization by organization. At the end the reader is very well informed on the mission and structure of German WWII intelligence. There is a tremendous amount of information in this book and the author's skillful writing style makes it all seem easy to understand. A masterpiece.
German Military Intelligence from A to Z February 2, 2001
29 out of 30 found this review helpful
In 1978, David Kahn attempted to write the first comprehensive history of German military intelligence in the Second World War. There results are mixed. The author is to be applauded for shedding considerable new light on this heretofore-neglected subject. However, this is an anecdote-driven study, not a comprehensive history. To be sure, Kahn covers virtually every aspect of intelligence collection and analysis in the Third Reich. In itself, the scope of this work is impressive and the reader quickly gains an appreciation for the amount of research required to produce this result.Organizationally, the book is divided into three main sections. After a sixty-page prologue that outlines the origins of German military intelligence, the first section details all the various collection agencies in the next 300 pages. Everything from agents, to radio intercept units, Luftwaffe interrogators, aerial and tactical reconnaissance is covered, each in its own chapter. The second section, of 69 pages, covers the various organizations that analyzed intelligence in the Third Reich. The final section, 75 pages long, analyzes three case studies (Operations Barbarossa, Torch and Overlord) where German intelligence failed. A 20-page conclusion outlines Kahn's theories on why German intelligence failed in its mission. There are also many useful extras, including excellent photos, original documents and a 1943 intelligence organization chart. While most sections are usually interesting to read, the anecdote-driven nature of this work is a severe detractor. The chapters bounce around chronologically, with Kahn typically providing an anecdote from the 1940 French campaign, then the Russian Front and then one from the Normandy campaign. This is a potentially misleading method for painting the portrait of an entire organization, by attempting to draw general conclusions from a few specific examples. Kahn consistently paints a picture of a fumbling, inept German intelligence effort, while ignoring similar Allied and Soviet intelligence failures in 1940-1942. Kahn's conclusions are very contentious. While grudgingly admitting that Germany was able to score some tactical intelligence successes that aided the early blitzkriegs, he blames the failure of strategic intelligence on five factors. Somehow, Kahn sees "unjustified arrogance" as a peculiarly German trait that caused the Wehrmacht to slight intelligence. Kahn's pro-British bias is striking; did not British General Browning ignore repeated indications that German armor was deployed near Arnhem in 1944? Kahn makes a great deal of one episode in 1945 where a dejected Hitler sweeps aside aerial photos indicating the coming Soviet offensive against Berlin, but Browning did virtually the same thing when shown low-level photos of SS panzers near Arnhem. The British Army also had a long history of arrogance leading to disaster at places ranging from Yorktown, Isandhlwana, Gallipoli, the Somme to Arnhem. A second poorly argued factor is the supposed greater need for intelligence on the defense. Knowledge of the terrain, weather and enemy dispositions is equally important on the offense or defense. While Kahn is correct in asserting that Germany's sudden entry into aggressive war did not give the Abwehr sufficient time to establish spy networks in England, the rest of this argument is founded on half-digested readings of Clausewitz. A third argument, that Nazi anti-Semitism "deprived German intelligence of many brains" is downright silly. Kahn infers that German intelligence, particularly code-breaking, would have been enhanced if Jewish mathematicians had not been purged. This ignores the fact that Allied breakthroughs were made by non-Jews like Turing and exaggerates the impact of a minority to alter the character of a dictatorship. The Third Reich had plenty of gifted individuals, many of whom gave their all for the regime. It didn't matter. Two final contributing factors are more pertinent. There is no doubt that the authority structure of the Fuehrer state inhibited the proper analysis of information as Kahn asserts. Hitler was a megalomaniac who increasingly rejected information that contradicted his view of "reality". However, the larger assertion that the culture of the German officer corps was endemically hostile to intelligence is weak. It is obvious that Kahn has never worked as an intelligence officer on a military staff, because he puts great stock in German regulations that state that the "intelligence officer works for the operations officer". One hears such attitudes in every army, including the US Army, and it is not due to intrinsic German factors. Furthermore, Kahn's assertion that Allied staffs were more efficient is laughable; the Allies based their staff methods on earlier German staff methods, but lacked the professionalism added by a General Staff cadre. Finally, the assertion that the General Staff officers assigned to intelligence were "second-rate" is oxymoronic, since these officers were the top 5% of the Wehrmacht. Despite thorough research, it is obvious that Kahn does not really understand intelligence operations. Crucial concepts like the intelligence cycle of task-collect-analyze-disseminate are never really discussed, but every phase counts. While Kahn continuously pounds on the Germans for poor efforts in collection and analyzing, he ignores tasking and dissemination. Did the Germans ask the right questions? It appears not, since although their various collectors gathered huge amounts of data about the enemy, there seemed to be no specific priorities. Much of intelligence work is separating the volumes of chaff from the small amount of wheat but the Germans clearly failed in this crucial task. As for dissemination, Kahn does not address this issue, but it would be interesting to know how much the "I've got a secret club" prevented crucial information from reaching the troops in a timely manner. This book should be on every professional intelligence officer's shelf, but taken with a grain of salt. Broad generalizations about ethnic tendencies or factors intrinsic only to one army should be viewed critically.
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