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War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism | 
 enlarge | Author: Douglas J. Feith
Publisher: Harper
Category: Book
List Price: $27.95
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Avg. Customer Rating:  41 reviews
Sales Rank: 45389
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 688
Shipping Weight (lbs): 2.1
Dimensions (in): 9.2 x 6 x 1.7
ISBN: 0060899735
Dewey Decimal Number: 973.931
EAN: 9780060899738
ASIN: 0060899735
Publication Date: March 1, 2008
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Product Description
In the years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, journalists, commentators, and others have published accounts of the Bush Administration's war on terrorism. But no senior Pentagon official has offered an inside view of those years, or has challenged the prevailing narrative of that war—until now. Douglas J. Feith, the head of the Pentagon's Policy organization, was a key member of Donald Rumsfeld's inner circle as the Administration weighed how to protect the nation from another 9/11. In War and Decision, he puts readers in the room with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, General Tommy Franks, and other key players as the Administration devised its strategy and war plans. Drawing on thousands of previously undisclosed documents, notes, and other written sources, Feith details how the Administration launched a global effort to attack and disrupt terrorist networks; how it decided to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime; how it came to impose an occupation on Iraq even though it had avoided one in Afghanistan; how some officials postponed or impeded important early steps that could have averted major problems in Iraq's post-Saddam period; and how the Administration's errors in war-related communications undermined the nation's credibility and put U.S. war efforts at risk. Even close followers of reporting on the Iraq war will be surprised at the new information Feith provides—presented here with balance and rigorous attention to detail. Among other revelations, War and Decision demonstrates that the most far-reaching warning of danger in Iraq was produced not by State or by the CIA, but by the Pentagon. It reveals the actual story behind the allegations that the Pentagon wanted to "anoint" Ahmad Chalabi as ruler of Iraq, and what really happened when the Pentagon challenged the CIA's work on the Iraq-al Qaida relationship. It offers the first accurate account of Iraq postwar planning—a topic widely misreported to date. And it presents surprising new portraits of Rumsfeld, Rice, Powell, Richard Armitage, L. Paul Bremer, and others—revealing how differences among them shaped U.S. policy. With its blend of vivid narrative, frank analysis, and elegant writing, War and Decision is like no other book on the Iraq war. It will interest those who have been troubled by conflicting accounts of the planning of the war, frustrated by the lack of firsthand insight into the decision-making process, or skeptical of conventional wisdom about Operation Iraqi Freedom and the global war on terrorism—efforts the author continues to support.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 36 more reviews...
A worthy defense of the Bush Administration November 28, 2008
Doug Feith's book is a welcome respite from much of the self-serving memoirs written by former Bush Administration officials. Although he has harsh criticism for the CIA and State (particularly Powell and Armitage), his enunciation of the reasons for going to war in Iraq is lucid and cogent. He may not convince his critics (of which there are many), but Feith's arguments should be taken seriously. He uses documents and notes from high-level meetings to try to correct a number of myths that have arisen over the decision to invade Iraq; he will not dispel those myths in the broad public conscience, but future historians will find his book a useful counterpoint to many of the anti-Bush Administration works.
Feith does not white-wash history, nor is this book an apology. He attempts to explain the reasons he and others made the decisions they made. At one point I recall him wishing to write a "gentlemanly book" (full disclosure -- I worked for Doug Feith, though as a career civil servant, not a political appointee). In these partisan times he may have come as close as any one can to having done just that.
 Timeline facts on the war on terrorism August 28, 2008
This book is not an attempt to revise history, but rather to set the record straight. It was written by an author who was in a unique position to observe the Pentagon decision making process leading to the war in Iraq. Feith's attention to a detailed timeline and the facts as then known at the time in question, and his extensive documentation references are most impressive. I predict this will become recognized as a historically important work. Those who believe in "Cowboy Bush" and "Bush Lied" will not like this book. Many strategic and tactical mistakes are documented, and should be lessons learned. The war on terrorism seems destined to go on for a long time, and knowledge about it's beginnings is important.
One hopes for more books of this type about the Iraq war. August 18, 2008
3 out of 4 found this review helpful
This is an essential fact book for every person curious about the U.S. government's decision making that led to the Afghan and Iraq wars and their pursuit in the early years.
Douglas Feith's memoir includes the period in which he served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. He covers discussions in which he was personally involved and clearly identifies information that he did not personally observe. As such, important pieces of the puzzle are left to the observations of the actual participants. One hopes that more books will provide additional first-hand information about the Iraq war and avoid the imaginative judgments of the uninformed. Michael Yon does well on the ground in Iraq, but all too many have built a big scaffold on which to hang President Bush and ignored their own limited perspective.
Feith provides appendices in which he outlines the Washington decision apparatus, shows the memos that provided outlines of decision options, a series of charts used to brief the President on the Iraq transition, the implementation outline for the President's March 2003 policy for an Iraq Interim Authority, and a policy briefing on training the Iraqi opposition. All told good evidence for the decision process used.
Feith explains that the chain of command goes from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the regional commander (Centcom's Tommy Franks handled the invasion of Iraq). The Centcom commander can (and regularly did) react negatively to any suggestions for change that did not come directly from the President or the Secretary of Defense.
The Pentagon staff and the Joint Chiefs provide support and advice only, and are not in the chain of command. Thus Wolfowitz (the Deputy Secretary of Defense), Feith and General Myers (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) in the Pentagon made suggestions to Rumsfeld and the President. These advisors supported the President's vision of the terrorist threat as a world-wide phenomena. They noted many separate organizations, but recognized their common goal of injuring America and their deadly danger to Americans. They shared the President's view and designed policies to reduce that threat, deter terrorism around the world, and did not narrow their vision to only Afghanistan, as many recommended.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld appears as a very demanding boss who was trying to refocus this largest of American bureaucracies into a leaner more flexible force. When the secretary's vision collided with officials who disagreed with him, he met a great deal of foot dragging. Never-the-less, he did move the army's divisional structure farther along the path toward brigade organization.
Mixed into the debate were multiple opinions about the force levels necessary in Iraq. In retrospect it is very clear that the force levels in Iraq were too small to permit a traditional occupation. Feith suggests the President's selected occupation policy might have made a large force less necessary, but it never had a chance. Head of the Coalition Provisional Authority Paul Bremer III caused shock across the administration when, without consultation, he published an article in the 08 September 2003 Washington Post headlined "Iraq's Path to Sovereignty." The seven steps Bremer outlined effectively aborted the President's plan for early and piecewise transfer of sovereignty to Iraq. The planned Iraq Interim Authority was not to be.
In retrospect it is easy to fault the President and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld for not immediately replacing Bremer. They must have felt "the man on the ground" had better information and in any event the shockwave from replacement would have been too high.
Bremer's dismantling of the Iraq Interim Authority had serious repercussions. Feith quotes Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in his chapter title "from liberation to occupation;" a very brief summation. Our support in Iraq dwindled. Our casualty figures soared to new records in November 2003, April 2004, and November 2004 before easing back and then running up again to May 2007.
On the other hand Rumsfeld's continual insistence on careful written arguments for and against many policies should help produce a wonderful historic record of his thinking as Secretary of Defense. Would that the Secretary of State would create such a record. Many government departments try to impose their policies with leaks and innuendo. Right or wrong Rumsfeld was clearly working very hard to produce a policy that was in the country's best interest and not necessarily just his turf. He regularly suggested that State be given more budget to handle some to the work that had fallen to Defense by default.
It appears that both the President and the Secretary of Defense over-reacted to the disastrous experience of a President and Secretary of Defense micromanaging the Vietnam War. Possibly because of this unfortunate history they were extremely reluctant to reverse decisions made at the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Regional Command (Centcom) level. They can be faulted for failing to push the Army to adopt a counterinsurgency strategy at an earlier date.
Early mistakes in a war are a foregone conclusion since your enemy has studied your previous tactics and made adjustments to counter them. We usually bumble along, adjust and eventually get tactics that work inside the enemy's decision-response envelope.
Adjusting strategy must be done more slowly, with much greater care, and requires careful communication to all levels. This takes time and can be seriously impeded by unclear or unrealistic goals. Rumsfeld did his best to generate clarity but some subordinates in Iraq were not able to operate at his level.
Feith is to be commended for producing a very readable book that contains a great deal of important history of the Washington decision making for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was indeed refreshing to read an account of the Washington decision making by an actual participant that is not clouded by wild suppositions or accusations.
Our present success in Iraq has built on the best efforts of a large number of men including the main characters of Feith's book. This success may not have been possible several years ago even if the troop surge had occurred then and General Petraeus had been the boss.
This reviewer considers it unfortunate that the President's many critics do not share his vision of the war's scope, but it is a point on which reasonable men can fail to agree. To me the debate closely parallels the European debate in the mid 1930's, but this time Churchill was in power.
 Feith is a typically brilliant Bush appointee August 16, 2008
1 out of 17 found this review helpful
Although General Tommy Franks famously referred to Feith as "the f****ng stupidest guy on the face of the earth.", this book demonstrates that he is in fact one of the most brilliant defense strategeists who ever walked the face of the earth. Feith has openly admitted that he had no desire to serve in Viet Nam because he was afraid of getting killed or having his beloved hair mussed up. But as undersecratary of something-or-other at the Defense Department, Feith was one of the fiercest proponents of going to war with Iraq for no good reason. In this great great book, Feith chronicles the monumental efforts he undertook to fabricate evidence of WMD in Iraq and of Saddam's connection to 9/11. Feith's detailed recounting of how the White House and the State Department were determined to go to war with Iraq for no other reason that to demonstrate U.S. military might to the world, is simultaneously chilling and comforting.
Although Doug Feith and John Bolton and George Bush and Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz and the many others who took this country to war have never had any desire to fight for their country when they had the opportunity, nobody can deny the patriotism and courage that these brave men have demonstrated in taking this great nation to war for no good reason against a country with a weak military but lots and lots of those Arab looking people who hate our freedoms.
Feith may be the f*****g stupidest guy on the face of the earth, but he's our f*****g stupidest guy on the face of the earth and thank god for that.
 It wasn't my fault, honest. Somewhat informative though. August 6, 2008
4 out of 6 found this review helpful
Feith's book is largely an attempt to justify his actions and policies as #3 in the Pentagon under Rumsfeld, more specifically with regards to the Iraq war.
Well, if your boss calls you in to grill on some mistakes you've made you can:
- admit failure and throw yourself at her mercy
- justify every single issue by saying that it wasn't your fault
- tactically admit some failures and defend your record on the rest.
Most people, but not Feith apparently, would recognize that rejecting any notion of having made a mistake is counterproductive. That is my main complaint with the book. It is very very defensive in nature. If mistakes were made, it's because Feith wasn't listened to. All the mistakes were made by Colin Powell, at State, or by the CIA. Later on, Paul Bremer, the 2nd US envoy to Iraq, becomes the book's scapegoat. Rumsfeld is brilliant throughout, except for _slight_ misgivings about his management style.
Feith states that Rumsfeld, correctly in Feith's view, decided to achieve unity of command by having DoD in sole and exclusive charge of post-war Iraq. Given that DoD was now running the show, why is everybody, except for DoD to blame for what went wrong? Note that I am not really criticizing the military here, more the Pentagon. Bremer was reporting directly to Rumsfeld, except that well, he wasn't - according to Feith.
Another interesting aspect is the focus on Iraq. The book starts at 9/11 and then takes about 150 pages (out of 520) to cover the invasion of Afghanistan and events up to mid 2002 at most. Past that? Nothing, no coverage of the decidedly mixed results in stabilizing the country. Just occasional pats on his own back to show how much better Afghanistan worked out than Iraq.
Feith bemoans the lack of outreach to the Muslim communities but then dismisses Powell's insistence on finding an Arab-Israeli solution as a bunch of wishy-washy irrelevant thinking. I really don't think you can have it both ways. Feith neglects to mention his contributions to the 'Clean Break' paper in 1996, advocating war with Iraq and halting the Oslo peace talks. Odd that he forgot.
Bremer's actions as head of the CPA are presented as mostly his. Well, who authorized things like the laws liberalizing Iraq's economy? I am pro free-market myself, but there is no justification for imposing capitalist laws on a country you occupy.
Feith's regrets the insistence on WMD as the cause for war. I think that is hypocritical. WMD was the easiest way to convince the electorate to go to war. No more, no less. The intelligence was faulty but I give Feith the benefit of the doubt when he says that that only became clear after the fact. Regardless, if Colin Powell chose to emphasize WMD rather than other factors, I can't really believe it was over Bush's objections.
Enough bad mouthing. This was a hard read - I don't like Feith and I don't like this administration. But there are some good reasons why this book is interesting:
- Feith occasionally makes good points. For example, lack of nation-building capability in the US institutions. Lack of funding for the Department of State.
- Difficulty of funding important initiatives by friendly foreign governments, as opposed to very loose purse strings to fund the Pentagon. I dunno about that one - what are the Cold War precedents?
- Where the information is coming from. When Feith states that the President was already thinking about Iraq on 9/12/2001, it is coming from him. Not from some foaming-at-the-mouth 9/11 conspiracy theorist. It presents the administration's side.
- Colin Powell looks a whole lot better coming out of Iraq than Bush's inner court. Rightly or wrongly, this book presents an alternative view of him as not having had the courage of his convictions.
Finally, I find it sadly amusing that, coming as #37, mine is going to be the first 3 star review. Apparently, as is customary in debate about the Iraq war nowadays, Americans still can't get over the Democrats/Republican split. Everyone loves, or hates, this book. "A Drink In the Desert" vs. "Don't reward this war criminal by buying his book". This lack of common ground doesn't look good for future US foreign policy maturity.
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