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Munich, 1938: Appeasement and World War II |  | Author: David Faber
Publisher: Simon & Schuster
Category: Book
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Rating:  9 reviews
Sales Rank: 145603
Media: Hardcover
Edition: 1St Edition
Pages: 528
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.4
Dimensions (in): 9.2 x 6.2 x 1.6
ISBN: 143913233X
Dewey Decimal Number: 940.53112
EAN: 9781439132333
ASIN: 143913233X
Publication Date: September 1, 2009
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Showing reviews 1-5 of 9
 Scholarly, interesting treatment August 25, 2010
rbnn (Berkeley, CA United States)
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
A deep and scholarly analysis of Hitler and Chamberlain's meetings and negotiations in 1938 surrounding the Anschluss and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Notable for the remarkable level of detail, in which each conversation and movement of the principal players is carefully tracked. This detail is still clearly subordinated to the overall narrative plan.
Chamberlain here comes across as a somewhat befuddled elderly man, way out of his depth. Hitler seems to be a shrewd and effective negotiator, winning games of brinksmanship with the other European powers.
At times reading the book one doesn't know whether to laugh or cry, the stories are so odd. The most peculiar surrounds Hitler's sacking of Blomberg and Fritsch, senior military officers who were perhaps a bit too independent for Hitler's taste. The way in which Fritsch in particular was let go is amazingly bizarre - involving the blackmail of an unrelated officer named Frisch, the name similarity, like in the movie Brazil, leading to his sacking. It is interesting to contrast the German officer's notion of honor with modern perspectives on their actions, which, of course, are very different.
The pace of the book overall is entertaining, although in the later chapters I sometimes found myself skimming as the mass of detail became a bit much. But overall it was interesting.
The main weaknesses of Faber's treatment, which focuses on personalities and actions, is that there is a bit less of a philosophical analysis or broad perspective. In particular, the book lacks a detailed legal analysis of the treaty obligations that were incurred and broken, and there is also little in the way of detailed military analysis (i.e., what would the military result have been had Britain gone to war?). Some maps would have been helpful as well.
Most references are in English and not German.
The level of scholarship in the book is excellent, the narrative persuasive and interesting throughout. I had a couple of reservations about isolated points here and there.
For example, on page 24, Faber characterizes what might have been a veiled attempt by Neurath to obtain a concession from Britain in exchange for permitting Halifax to meet Hitler as an "attempt at blackmail." But there is no indication in the text that Neurath's suggestion was anything more than standard diplomatic attempt to gain a concession. I fail to perceive why it should be characterized as blackmail (particularly in light of the more specific meaning of the term in the Frisch affair later in the book).
On page 25, Faber states that "Göring enthusiastically had assured [Henderson] that `he had seldom heard Herr Hitler speak more in favour of an understanding with Great Britain' - a shamelessly brazen remark for Göring to have made, given that just a few hours earlier he had been listening to Hitler's diatribe at the Reich Chancellery." Here, the author suggests both that Göring's statement is false and that it contradicted Hitler's comments at the Reich Chancellery. But in fact Göring's statement seems to be artfully phrased so as not to be contradicted by Hitler's statements at the Reich Chancellery if, in fact, Hitler almost never spoke in favor of an understanding with Britain, which he likely didn't.
The context is a little unclear from Faber's description, but Göring may be using the kind of circumlocution employers notoriously use in recommending problem employees, e.g., "You will be very fortunate to get this person to work for you" and the like. In any case, Faber's characterization of the import of Göring's comment or of Henderson's view of it seems at best confusing.
Finally, the book jacket states, for example, that Chamberlain held the piece of paper that "contained the promise that Britain and Germany would never go to war." But the actual document on page 414 seems less clear. It says
"[w]e are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries." If this language is a promise never to go to war, it's very circumspect.
For fictional treatments of this period of time, let me recommend Kazuo Ishiguro's brilliant novel, Remains of the Day (the movie is excellent as well). Alan Furst has some good novels about this time, e.g. Spies of Warsaw.
Driving off the cliff July 4, 2010
W. Wirtanen (St. Louis MO)
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Knowing the end of this historical event, you get to watch good men's ideals get in the way of fighting evil.
David Faber recounts the events on both sides leading up to the Munich Pact of 1938 that sacrificed Czechoslovakia in the name of peace. Faber's recounting of this historical account of can best be summed up by the quote in the book, "The choice is not between war and peace but between war now or war later."
Faber brings the reader inside these fateful events to watch people's actions and reactions.
I found this book somewhat disconcerting knowing what is to follow. All through the book, you keep asking how the participants did not realize the danger. Faber chronicling of the events answers this question.
Although I found it difficult to determine the relative importance of various positions in the English Parliamentary system, I found it a cautionary tale of giving evil a pass.
This is a fascinating read that has historical implications to this day. If you want to see how idealism and hubris can blind common sense, read this book.
 Well Written but Limited January 24, 2010
J. Moran (Illinois, USA)
11 out of 11 found this review helpful
In the Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938, Britain and France sold out Czechoslovakia to the Nazis and set the stage for World War II. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain gleefully announced to cheering crowds in Britain that he had obtained "peace with honor" and "peace for our time." Less than one year later, World War II began.
Author Faber presents the origin and culmination of the Munich crisis, mostly from the British view point. Britain's diplomatic aims and actions, its cabinet politics and the maneuvering in both the press and Parliament are considered in detail, as are many of the personalities involved. Faber has assiduously mined official and personal documents and memoirs to present their public and private thoughts, a device that (together with Faber's considerable writing skill) makes these people live on the page.
Despite this level of detail, much of the history leading to Munich is omitted or not explored deeply. This is the case, to give one example only, with Germany's unilateral reoccupation of the Rhineland (a clear breach of the Versailles Agreement) and the subsequent collapse of the Locarno Pact and the Stresa Front. The British had orchestrated the latter agreements to normalize relations with Germany and provide security for France. Their collapse ended the security system envisioned at Versailles.
Also missing is any detailed exploration of how and why the climate of appeasement arose and had such sway in Britain. Faber makes clear that appeasement was the majority view in Britain and that Chamberlain, whatever his other faults (arrogance and naïveté' among them), was merely leading the British where they very much wanted to go.
Except for Germany, no other country gets nearly the attention that is lavished on Britain (which was admittedly by far the leading Western Power in the appeasement effort). Even with Germany, however, much is unexplored.
Again to give only one example, Faber seems to believe that the Blomberg and Fritsch scandals, the former idiotic and the latter tragic, gave Hitler dominance over the Army. Yet this dominance was probably assured in 1934 when Col. Gen. Blomberg, already Minister of Defense, urged Hitler to act against the SA and its head, Ernst Rohm, whom Blomberg knew was seeking to have the SA take over the Army. Hitler, for this and other reasons, unleashed a lawless purge against the SA (and others), murdering many, including Rohm. Blomberg condoned the purge and placed the Army on alert to cooperate if need be. After President Hindenburg's death later that year, Blomberg had the Army's officers take the infamous oath of personal loyalty to Hitler. This was the corrupt bargain that sealed the Army's fate.
All other participants at Munich are reduced in the narrative to bit players supporting the lead of the Germans and the British. In particular the French are ghosts in the story as Faber relates it. There is little discussion of the twists of French politics and policies that led to their supine attitude at Munich. Similarly little attention is devoted to the attitude of the Soviets or to their deliberate exclusion by the Western powers from Munich, or to the refusal by Britain especially to try to involve the United States. Finally, a review of the bibliography shows that the great majority of sources listed are in English, which may be the reason for the emphasis on Britain.
Faber tells a compelling with skill, but the gaps make the story incomplete. Is it possible that concerns about the book's length (by the publisher?) may have played a role here? I do not think that Faber's book is nearly so complete or comprehensive as Telford Taylor's "Munich: The Price of Peace," originally published in 1979, although Taylor's book is less vividly written and is twice as long.
A Solid Narrative January 6, 2010
D. Selditz (Seattle, WA)
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
Few authors are able to write narratives that keep a reader's interest from beginning to end, especially when the subject is diplomatic history. As a product of the '50's I was inculcated with the saga of Munich, Chamberlain and Hitler from grade school through high school and mostly in brief episodic and anecdotal fashion. Faber has serious talent (understatement). For me this was re-learning history in spades and especially on a subject of deep interest. Parts of the book read like a thriller from Hitler's browbeating of Schuschnigg, his constant mad tirades over Eduard Benes to anyone within earshot, the Wermacht constantly alerted then told to stand down and finally the diplomats and secretaries running and scurrying back and forth to deliver eleventh hour messages. On who's neck would Hitler bring down the Sword of Sigfreid next?
I misunderstood Chamberlain for years but the book left me convinced that he was the wrong man in the wrong place at the wrong time, or in today's parlance, old school. I think Faber used diary excerpts well and was able to put the reader in the room. I was astounded by Chamberlain's obsequiousness and bootlicking of Hitler. In spite of this I continued to remind myself that Chamberlain and most of the British did not want another Somme. I'm also left with a better impression of how manifestly insane Hitler was. Faber rightly places the betrayal of the Czechs in the lap of Chamberlain but I'd also like to give the French their due for backing away from their part of the TOV. I don't think much about historical "what if's" but will always wonder what the outcome would have been if Churchill had been the PM. The Munich agreement was indeed a diplomatic blunder and the ripple effect continues today in the form of historical analogy.
This was not another dry, laborious exercise of a subject that's been revisited ad infinitum but an academic work with a feeling of urgency and drama.
A fascinating account of the people and events that will embolden Hitler to wage war. January 2, 2010
Dave Schranck (Anaheim Ca)
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
David Faber has written a most thoughtful and well-researched study of the time leading up to the Munich Conference, the conference itself and the immediate repercussions that evolved from that conference. All the key players are covered: Hitler, Chamberlain, Eden, Halifax, Mussolini, Blomberg, Keitel, Fritisch and many others. The author also covers some of the actions Hitler undertook to make Germany compliant to his wishes as well as ready for war. I was completely surprised, expecting a dry, political reconstruction of the facts but instead received a poignant and intriguing look at the behind the scene story of the people involved in this drama that will lead to war for most of Europe. The author clearly shows the personal aspirations, fears and hopes of the people of the British and French governments in trying to curtail Hitler's thirst to recapture the lands lost to Germany after the defeat of WWI while avoiding another war. Even after 20 years since WWI, the Allied countries had still not recovered and Chamberlain had no appetite to throw his country into another devastating war. The reasoning is understandable but naiveté when you consider who his antagonist was; a man who feeds on and was energized on weakness. That's why Chamberlain continued to appeased Hitler until the invasion of Poland in Sept 1939.
The account also clearly shows Hitler's devious ways as he plays with these people as he strives to obtain his goals. Some of those goals will be the annexing of the Sudetenland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, the city of Danzig. Taking over Czechoslovakia will be the keystone coverage in this book. During the Munich Conference, Hitler using the threat of war and with the help of Mussolini intimidate Chamberlain and Daladier to sacrifice Czechoslovakia for the sake of a tenuous peace. A short time later, defying the Munich agreement, Hitler carves up Czechoslovakia.
The author and former politician has certainly done his homework and provides a wealth of information on the personal and public lives of key people. These are the people who through their actions or non-actions will cause WWII. The author has done a magnificent job of setting the stage for the lead up to WWII. If you have an interest in WWII and how and why it started then this book would be the ideal place to start.
Showing reviews 1-5 of 9
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