Battleship: The Loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse

As usual, Middlebrook provides excellent background information on the key individuals, the ships themselves, their mission and the circumstances of their deployment to Singapore. Strategically, these ships were ordered by Winston Churchill to the Far East to help deter the coming war with Japan. Admiral Phillips, a high level staff officer with an understanding of war plans, was given charge of the squadron and tasked with a deterrence mission. Unfortunately, the battleships arrived in Singapore on 2 December 1941 and Japan attacked only six days later. The deterrence function of the warships was thus a failure.

Much of the book then focuses on Admiral Phillips controversial decision to sortie from Singapore in an attempt to find and destroy the Japanese invasion convoys bound for Malaya. Phillips went charging off into a very uncertain situation with only two battleships and four destroyers. He apparently believed that his magnificent warships could fight their way through to smash the Japanese convoys, while suffering acceptable levels of damage. Only a minimal effort was made to coordinate with the Royal Air Force for fighter cover prior to the sortie; a fighter squadron was dedicated to supporting the battleships but given no specific instructions.

Prior to this account, I had always believed that the battleships were sunk rather easily by a well-coordinated Japanese air attack. In fact, the Japanese squadrons were low on fuel and disordered, the attacks conducted piece-meal. HMS Repulse did a superb job dodging about nineteen torpedoes before receiving fatal hits. On the other hand, the much better-built HMS Prince of Wales was crippled early in the fight by a lucky torpedo hit that caused massive flooding and knocked out most of her electrical systems. The Japanese achieved 11 torpedo hits out of 49 launched and 2 bomb hits of 23 dropped. Just as the Prince of Wales was sinking, ten British fighters arrived over the scene. Admiral Phillips had never radioed for air support and this squadron only arrived due to the independent call for assistance by HMS Repulse. Middlebrook notes that had Phillips called for these fighters just two hours earlier, they could have disrupted the unescorted Japanese bombers and probably have helped save at least one of the battleships.

The main culprit for this disaster is Admiral Phillips. Middlebrook asserts that, "throughout the operation, Phillips continued to show a disregard, almost a contempt, for the dangers of any type of air attack" and, "Phillips was confident that his ships could defend themselves and that he was determined not to ask for the help of another service." Finally, "two great ships and many good men were lost because one stubborn old sea-dog refused to acknowledge that he had been wrong." However, despite this focus on the inter-service bickering as the main culprit of the disaster, the authors then go on to pass judgment on battleships as a whole. After this disaster they assert, battleships were little more than "floating artillery" that could only operate under conditions of friendly air superiority.


a sad story indeed   June 13, 2000
 7 out of 7 found this review helpful

This very readable account of the folly of Force Z was very thoroughly researched, using official documents, logs, interviews and other conventional sources. The book combines a narrative of events with analysis of the strategic and tactical aspects involved, a detailed technical rundown regarding construction, armour, armament, and much more of the POW. The authors alternate between academic discussion and survivor's narratives, thereby maintaining tension and interest from beginning to end. It is interesting to note that the King George V class of battleships (of which the Prince of Wales was the second ship) was quite a mediocre design (see combinedfleet.com section on battleships), this a direct result of Britain building only two battleships between 1918 and 1936, resulting in a starvation of design innovation and shipyard expertise. Central in this book is the description of the errors and folly of the voyage of Force Z, and this leaves the impartial reader with deep regret upon reading of the unnecessary sacrifice of so many, who fought very bravely.


Interesting Story of Airpower vs Battleships   May 3, 2000
 5 out of 5 found this review helpful

This book covers the story of the HMS Prince of Wales and the HMS Repulse from their arrival in the pacific in late 1941. It starts by covering the decisions which led to these ships being sent to the Far East despite a still viable German navy, then discusses the ships themselves, their crews, and their histories.

The book is written in a narrative style and makes heavy use of actual messages radioed to and from the vessels. These do an effective job of establishing the situation and give the reader insight into why certain decisions were made. Also used are official Japanese documents so the reader gets a view of the battle from both sides.

Diagrams of the ships show the locations of bomb and torpedo hits. During the interludes between air raids, the author covers the damage inflicted thus far in an almost checklist manner: pumps, counter flooding procedures, communication status, ventilation and lighting, steering, anti-aircraft armament... I can almost picture the officers taking account of what they have to work with and forming plans on how to prepare for the next assault.

After the sinkings, the remaining chapters cover the rescue of the crews and an analysis of the battle and its aftermath. Overall it's an easy read and presents an interesting view of a battle which was one of the first to prove Billy Mitchell right.