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Red Storm over the Balkans: The Failed Soviet Invasion of Romania, Spring 1944 (Modern War Studies) | 
enlarge | Author: David M. Glantz Publisher: University Press of Kansas Category: Book
List Price: $39.95 Buy New: $27.68 You Save: $12.27 (31%)
New (17) Used (6) from $22.50
Avg. Customer Rating: 7 reviews Sales Rank: 338273
Media: Hardcover Number Of Items: 1 Pages: 448 Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.8 Dimensions (in): 9.1 x 6.2 x 1.4
ISBN: 0700614656 Dewey Decimal Number: 940.542198 EAN: 9780700614653 ASIN: 0700614656
Publication Date: November 16, 2006 Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days Shipping: International shipping available Condition: Brand New, Perfect Condition, Please allow 4-14 business days for delivery. 100% Money Back Guarantee, Over 1,000,000 customers served.
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| Editorial Reviews:
Product Description Germany's Eastern Front in World War II saw many campaigns and battles that have been "forgotten" by a Soviet Union that tried to hide its military failures. The Red Army's invasion of Romania in April and May 1944 was one such campaign, which produced nearly 200,000 casualties and tarnished the reputations of its commanders. The redoubtable David Glantz, the world's leading authority on the Soviet military in World War II, now restores this tale to its proper place in the annals of World War II. Working from newly available Russian and long-neglected German archives-plus Red Army unit histories and commanders' memoirs-Glantz reconstructs an imposing mosaic that reveals the immense scope and ambitious intent of the first Iasi-Kishinev offensive. His re-creation shows that Stalin was not as preoccupied with a direct route to Berlin as he was with a "broad front" strategy designed to gain territory and find vulnerable points in Germany's extended lines of defense. If successful, the invasion would have also eliminated Romania as Germany's ally, cut off the vital Ploiesti oilfields, and provided a base from which to consolidate Soviet power throughout the Balkans. Glantz discloses General Ivan Konev's strategic plan as the 2nd Ukrainian Front prepared its Iasi offensive and fought a climactic battle with the German Eighth Army and its Romanian allies in the Tirgu-Frumos region in early May, then the regrouping of General Rodion Malinovsky's 3rd Ukrainian Front for its decisive offensive toward Kishinev, which aborted in the face of a skillful counterstroke by a threadbare German Sixth Army. Glantz describes how the Wehrmacht, with a nucleus of combat veterans, was able to beat back Soviet forces hampered by spring floods, while already fragile Soviet logistical support was further undermined by the Wehrmacht's scorched-earth strategy. Although Konev's and Malinovsky's offensives failed, the Red Army managed to inflict heavy losses on Axis forces, exacerbating the effects of Germany's defeats in the Ukraine and making it more difficult for the Wehrmacht to contain the Soviet juggernaut's ultimate advance toward Berlin. This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 2 more reviews...
Great Book for advanced readers May 10, 2007 5 out of 6 found this review helpful
This guy is simply the best military writer i've ever read. At my age, i need a magnifying glass for the maps. That's my one objection, but i assume younger people will have no problem. This is another Glantz special: an utterly fantastic detailed miltary description of the initial Soviet attempt to invade Romania. These books must be a godsend for the companies that make wargames. After reading Glantz books, i feel like becoming a wargame designer myself! If you're into the movements of armies, corps, divisions, this book is heaven. The maps are great (though i wish they were bigger!) If you want to read about the "personal" or "human interest" side of war, don't buy this book, there's nothing in it for you. It's also not for the casual military reader, it's very detailed. I only wish some of Glantz' other publications werent so darned expensive; i'd own them all. He's simply the best military writer i've ever read.
Glantz's Greatest Defeat February 28, 2007 7 out of 8 found this review helpful
Glantz's books differ quite significantly in quality. Of the eight I have read, this was the worst. The writing is relatively poor, and features a lot of repetition, with little flow or tension. It feels rushed. The book is crying out for a good editor to really clean it up. The history, of course, is excellent as always. But I would recommend his operational studies of Mars and Kursk before this one. They are both excellent.
disappointing February 22, 2007 16 out of 19 found this review helpful
Being an avid student of the Russo-German war and having a few hundred books on the subject, ranging from detailed German unit histories to books with a wide scope like those by Earl Ziemke, I eagerly anticipated the arrival of this book as it promised to fill a gap in my knowledge of the Eastern Front. I was also worried, because I have all the books by Glantz and they can be divided into three categories: boring and unreadable (whenever he focuses on Russian sources; example: The Battle for Lvov), extremely interesting and well written (because they offer new information and new insights; example: Zhukov's greatest defeat) and books that offer a bit of both (example: When Titans Clashed). This latest book, I am afraid, falls into the last category. After reading it my first impulse was to rip out the first 150 pages. Being a book lover I did not do this of course, but still... In this first third of the book Glantz describes, no sorry, lists, units, commanders (boring the reader to tears) and actually describes what is on the maps!! Any editor worth his salt should have told Glantz to stop babbling and refer the material to an appendix or (in case of the battle dispositions) refer to the maps. On the plus side: mainly thanks to German sources, the book does offer new information about the Red Army's failed spring campaign, which in the end is why I am still glad that I bought the book. If, like me, you want to know more about the fighting around Targul Frumos or the Dnjestr bridgeheads, I am afraid you will have to buy this book. Hence three stars (just sufficient). However, I really hope that for Glantz' next few books somebody with common sense will sift through the material and make Glantz realise that, ultimately, a book should not only contain lots of information but first and foremost be READABLE! As a writer about the war myself as well as a voracious reader I think I know what I am talking about. Glantz can give me a call any day of the week for some free advice.
Jack Didden
Dreary, plodding reading February 13, 2007 31 out of 36 found this review helpful
OK, up front we all admit that David Glantz knows more about WWII on the Eastern Front than any other person alive. That said, this is operational military history at its worst. An endless barrage of corps & division numbers, grouping letters, directions of attacks & campaigns, etc., etc. The whole thing reads like an over-long after action report prepared by a junior officer who never took a liking to writing coherent narrative essays. There is no political context discussed in this book, nor is there discussion about weapons, weaponery, personalities, etc. Sure, its authoritative, but does that mean it has to be such a drudge to get through? I put this book down half-way through and read 4-5 other books before I worked up the patience to tackle this to its finish.
Puts It Together Nicely January 19, 2007 10 out of 11 found this review helpful
Glantz was not well-served by his editors here; they chose the provocative title and Glantz throughout maintains this as some sort of 'lost' campaign that 'he found'. As the prior reviewer from Vienna stated, it's not so 'lost'. Targul-Frumos has been the subject of lectures and papers at US military academies and in technical journals from both sides since the late 1940's. So Glantz does overstate that point. What Glantz does achieve is a unique synthesis of the diverse sources and he analyzes them skillfully. He puts it all together and gives it context that no other Eastern Front historian had yet done, just as he did with 'Operation Mars'. Unfortunately, the reviewer from Vienna is right about the small number of mistakes and, indeed, there are a few more than he cited. Editors let Glantz down there as well. They exist to pick up those little typos or tiny mis-statements. Like Glantz's other books, it reads a little dry, but I overlook that and give him five stars for the skill and value of his presentation and analysis. Not perfect but VERY needed.
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