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Before Stalingrad: Barbarossa, Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941 (Battles & Campaigns) | 
 enlarge | Author: David M. Glantz
Publisher: Tempus
Category: Book
Buy New: $41.58
New (1) Used (1) from $31.77
Avg. Customer Rating:  9 reviews
Sales Rank: 434471
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 319
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.8
Dimensions (in): 7.8 x 4.9 x 1
ISBN: 0752426923
Dewey Decimal Number: 355
EAN: 9780752426921
ASIN: 0752426923
Publication Date: November 1, 2003
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Product Description
Operation Barbarossa—as this campaign is famously called—was arguably the greatest land campaign mankind has ever fought. Hitler named his assault after the 12th-century Frederick I Barbarossa, an emperor of the First Reich. Although he succeeded in capturing almost 40 percent of European Russia, Hitler was defeated there. Exploiting newly available Soviet archives, David M. Glantz challenges the time-honored explanation that poor weather, bad terrain, and Hitler’s faulty strategic judgement produced the German defeat. He reveals how and why the Red Army thwarted Hitler’s seemingly inexorable progress.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 4 more reviews...
 Concise summary of Barbarossa to the Soviet Winter Offensive October 18, 2007
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
This is a concise, strategic overview of the Barbarossa campaign. Unlike many other works by David Glantz, this is a relatively light tome that can easily be read in 2-3 sittings and is more of a popular work and not a scholarly work. Don't get me wrong, there is a lot of detail, and the text is well-documented and footnoted, but as you can devine from some of the other reviews, this work is more readable compared with some of Glantz's denser tomes. This book has many of the same strengths and weaknesses of Glantz other works. There is an incrdible amount of detail packed tightly into well-worded prose. On the other hand, Glantz is so pro-Soviet that you wonder how the Germans advanced 10 miles into the Soviet Union with all the hyperbole.
Beyond the purely historical details, Glantz weighs in on the question of whether Barbarossa was winnable from the German perspective, and whether Guderian's right turn to Kiev was strategically necessary or a fatal loss of time and dissipation of strength as many have argued that it was. Glantz concludes that the Germans could not have marched on Moscow without the destruction of the Soviet armies in and around Kiev for two reasons. First, it would not have been possible for Army Group Center to advance on Moscow with such a strong force on it's right flank. Second, and more importantly, the Soviet armies covering Moscow uselessly dissipated their strength in foolish counterattacks trying to save their comrades trapped in Kiev. The Germans would not have been able to advance so easily to the gates of Moscow had this force (of roughly equal size to the armies annihilated in Kiev) not destroyed itself. Thus Glantz concludes that the right turn by Guderian was critical, the Germans could not have taken Moscow even if they simply bypassed the armies in Kiev.
Was Barbarossa winnable in one campaign? The German General Staff and Hitler thought so. Glantz says no. The strategic depth of the Soviet Union and the ability to replace destroyed armies one after the other meant that the Soviet Union could only be defeated in a long campaign. I think that Glantz arguments are compelling. The lessons of Poland and France did not necessarily appy to the Soviet Union. My personal view is that the war was won or lost in 1942 with the success or failure of Operation Edelweiss.
The bottom line is that this is about the best concise history of Barbarossa around, and if you can ignore Glantz's favoritism, definitely worth the money. Finally, do not be mislead by the title of the book. I initially thought that this volume covered the first two years of the war in the East (i.e. up to Stalingrad), it does not. The narrative ends as the Soviet Winter offensive of 1941-42 peters out.
A must read on the initial phase of the German-Soviet war June 17, 2007
Of the three books I have so far read from Glantz, this one is for sure the best and easiest to read. (OK, also the shortest.) I personally very much enjoyed this book, and also found a lot of new information in it.
 Excellent, but very dry history December 8, 2006
Like all of Glantz' books, this one also tells its story with authority. However, the focus is on the large scale, strategic operations and the high command, and therefore does not make for interesting reading.
A Tough Read, But Rewarding September 28, 2006
6 out of 6 found this review helpful
This is not a book that goes into great detail about individual battles or skirmishes. It does, however, provide an extremely detailed account of the horrendously, seemingly impossible task Stavka faced in dealing with the German onslaught. Glantz provides readers with mind-numbinlgy detailed summaries of armies created on paper only to be slaughtered on the field, of Fronts being designated by desperate planners only to be shattered, and of Generals placed at the heads of armies only to be sacked, or worse, when they, almost, inevitably failed to win victories.
The huge amount of data Glantz provides is almost impossible to keep track of. This book was slow going for me. More maps, higher quality maps, and more charts and tables would have been welcome. The nearly frequent typographical errors were annoying. The excellent endnotes were sometimes hard to locate. I would have preferred footnotes.
Soviet reasons for failure of Barbarossa January 8, 2006
16 out of 17 found this review helpful
David M. Glantz's book, Before Stalingrad rewrite the operational history of the German invasion of Soviet Union between June to December of 1941. Glantz's approach is to informed the reader that it took more then German's missteps and mother nature that determined the outcome of the 1941 campaign but the Soviet's efforts and mobilization of fresh units that also had a major hand. One of the major factors of German failure according to Glantz was the appearance of fresh Soviet reserves units that defied the German intelligence service. One point Glantz really wanted to make was that the German efforts toward Kiev wasn't an error by Hitler but an necessary objective to ensure any chance of German victory in Moscow if there was to be one. He cites the huge amount of Soviet troops trapped around Kiev, wide open flanks that the Germans will be exposing and fresh Soviet units waiting for the Germans in front of Moscow before many of them were expended in premature Soviet offensives that allowed Germans to advanced toward Moscow. I believed there is many merits to his line of arguement if we looked at German's efforts at Rostov and its consequences.
The main angle of study seem to be centered around central operation of the campaign, Soviet responses to Army Group Center seem to highlights the book's main theme. I think the author chooses this approach since this was where the campaign of 1941 was ultimately decided.
The book appears to be well written and well researched with plenty of Soviet material. Its an operational study of the 1941 campaign and looked closely from the Soviet point of view as all of Glantz's books. Its a short book and far more simply written then many of Glantz's other works. It could have used more maps and a more clearer order of battle table.
The book come highly recommended to those interested in this subject matter.
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