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Mussolini and his Generals: The Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922-1940 (Cambridge Military Histories) | 
 enlarge | Author: John Gooch
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Category: Book
List Price: $35.00
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Avg. Customer Rating:  3 reviews
Sales Rank: 297838
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 666
Shipping Weight (lbs): 2.4
Dimensions (in): 9.1 x 6.3 x 1.9
ISBN: 0521856027
Dewey Decimal Number: 355.03354509043
EAN: 9780521856027
ASIN: 0521856027
Publication Date: December 24, 2007
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
Condition: DJ, cover and inside pages are all in excellent condition in this first published edition by Cambridge University Press.
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Product Description
This is the first authoritative study of the Italian armed forces and the relationship between the military and foreign policies of Fascist Italy from Mussolini's rise to power in 1922 to the catastrophic defeat of 1940. Using extensive new research, John Gooch explores the nature and development of the three armed forces, their relationships with Mussolini and the impact of his policies and command, the development of operational and strategic thought, and the deployment and use of force in Libya, Abyssinia and Spain. He emphasizes Mussolini's long-term expansionist goals and explains how he responded to the structural pressures of the international system and the contingent pressures of events. This compelling account shows that while Mussolini bore ultimate responsibility for Italy's fateful entry into the Second World War, his generals and admirals bore a share of the blame for defeat through policies that all too often rested on irrationality and incompetence.
Book Description
The first authoritative study of the Italian armed forces and the relationship between the military and foreign policies of Fascist Italy from 1922 to 1940. John Gooch shows that Mussolini's generals and admirals bore a share of the blame for defeat through policies that all too often rested on incompetence.
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| Customer Reviews:
Excellent Book October 21, 2008
In the second world war the Italian army performed badly. It was not able to make headway in the battle for France. It was defeated when it tried to invade Greece and Egypt. It collapsed entirely when trying to defend Sicily. The only success that it had was in Africa when the Germans supplemented an Italian infantry army with the German Africa Corps. The addition of German armour and air support led to a number of victories.
This book shows that the failure to perform was due to decisions made before the war about how to equip and structure the armed services. Italy was a relatively poor country compared to France, Britain and Germany. It fought the war with equipment that was designed in the 30's. It also had a ambitious armaments program as it sought to build a large air force a significant navy and a considerable army. Germany an economically more powerful country was not as ambitious. It had a large army and air force but only a small navy. Italy not only had to defend a colonial empire in Libya and Somalia but it also conquered Ethiopia in the 30s. It needed the navy to protect its empire, to allow it to conquer colonies and to safeguard its shoreline. Most of the naval expenditure went into a battleship fleet. This proved very vulnerable to air attack and was ineffective in the war.
The expenditure on the air force had a range of problems. The most significant was the tendency to parcel out small orders amongst a number of firms. This meant that there were no large firms created to be able to cope with the demand of a war. In addition the design of a large number of the Italian aircraft were poor and they became obsolete quickly. The book illustrates that the Italians picked up the wrong message from the Spanish civil war. The Germans were able realise that modern fighter war fare was about speed and not manoeuvrability. Their new fighter the BF 109 was able to dominate the air for the early part of the war. The Italians on the other hand were satisfied with the performance of their aircraft not putting into context that they were only contesting against obsolete Russian aircraft.
Whilst the Italians recognised the importance of armoured warfare and sought to incorporate tanks into their army they relied on lightweight models which were armoured with only machine guns. To make matters worse the Italians failed to supply their forces with effective anti-tank guns. On top of this by 1938 the Italian army was poorly supplied with field artillery. Attempts were made to provide more up to date artillery of a high calibre but this was not complete by the outbreak the war.
During the war most of the major belligerents developed new weapons. The Germans upgraded their tanks with armour and guns. The British moved from low powered two engine bombers to four engine bombers. Italy was limited in its ability to innovate because of the nature of its aircraft and automotive industry. Its weapons simply became more and more obsolete.
This book whilst not an exciting page turner outlines in clear detail the complexity of Italian decision making prior to the war. Why a country which might have had either a modern air force or navy instead ended up with three poorly equipped services. From the 20s on it was not clear to Italy what war it was going to fight. Would it be a war against France and Yugoslavia? Would it be a war to gain colonies or a war to prevent Austria being incorporated into Germany. Each different type of war required different types of expenditure and planning. Should roads and defensive lines be created in Libya? Should there be preparations to invade Yugoslavia? The lack of focus and change of priorities led to a gradual loss of advantage against the other major powers as they re-armed in the late 1930's to the point at which its armed forces were ineffectual.
Great treatise on Mussolini & Italy's military preparations before WWII July 20, 2008
12 out of 13 found this review helpful
I can only second the earlier reviewer that this book is a must for anyone interested in Italy between the wars. At times it is tedious and very slow-moving, but one garners the impression that Italy was equally slow-moving. In many ways it seems that Mussolini was gaming with his armed forces, never obtaining sufficient budgets for their development, and never seriously building the economic supports for an effective military machine nor mobilizing popular support for a military establishment. Italy remained decidedly non-martial, and Mussolini used bragging and bombast when he should have been using leadership.
The Piedmont generals also come in for substantial criticism for their incompetence and inability to forge a unity of command or consensus for action. The litany of conferences and squabbles are dreary, and no one could put aside their personal ambition or creature comforts for the good of Italy. The reader is left hoping that someone will step up to the plate, but they never do. Yes, Italy lacked natural resources, but they were obtainable in North Africa, overseas, or could be developed domestically if the will had been there. This volume shows conclusively that this will was not present anywhere -- in Mussolini or any other.
Mussolini was playing the game of being an imperialistic great power as if the date were 1880, and was out of touch with reality. Italy possessed no national will for war or the building of economic power, and would disappear from the international stage of significant nations as a result. This volume definitively shows how and why that happened.
Best summary to date of Fascist Italian military policy January 21, 2008
13 out of 14 found this review helpful
This is an excellent account of the military situation in Italy leading up to World War II. There have been many myths about the Italian military which are laid to rest with this book. First and foremost the structure of the Italian military is analyzed in detail and the rise of the air force is clearly seen. With Italy's extensive coast and lack of natural resources the air force becomes increasingly important to defend the coast and protect shipping. While this book tracks the various approaches of the armed services and shows their incompatibility with eachother via command staffs it also shows how diplomacy and the military interacted under Mussolini.
Mussolini insisted on personally controlling almost all details of both his foreign policy and military. Each wing was under his intense scrutiny and he controlled much of what they did. Often as is proven here inexperienced and ineffective leaders prospered under this system only because they had the Duce's blessing. Men like Badoglio were able to professionalize and organize the services somewhat but it was only in as far as Mussolini would allow. Overall Italy is shown to be at a tremendous lack of resources which hinders their war effort from the start. Inability to build larger ships due to lack of metal, lack of oil and lack of livestock all weighed heavily on Italy in the prewar period. When the war starts these would become major points of failure for the country.
In all an excellent book for those who want to learn more in this growing field about fascist Italy. Highly recommend for not only the military historian and the World War II historian but those interested in how diplomacy and military interacted in Fascist Italy.
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