Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General | 
 enlarge | Authors: Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein, Anthony G. Powell, B. H. Liddell Hart, Martin Blumenson
Publisher: Zenith Press
Category: Book
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Avg. Customer Rating:  43 reviews
Sales Rank: 44544
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 524
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.5
Dimensions (in): 8.4 x 5.5 x 1.2
ISBN: 0760320543
Dewey Decimal Number: 940.531343092
EAN: 9780760320549
ASIN: 0760320543
Publication Date: August 22, 2004
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Product Description
Originally published in Germany in 1955, and in England and the United States in 1958, this classic memoir of WWII by a man who was an acknowledged military genius and probably Germany's top WWII general, is now made available again. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein described his book as a personal narrative of a soldier, discussing only those matters that had direct bearing on events in the military field. The essential thing, as he wrote, is to "know how the main personalities thought and reacted to events." This is what he tells us in this book.His account is detailed, yet dispassionate and objective. "Nothing is certain in war, when all is said and done," But in Manstein's record, at least, we can see clearly what forces were in action. In retrospect, perhaps his book takes on an even greater significance.
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 A Great Memior From a Flawed General May 12, 2008
2 out of 3 found this review helpful
Let me first say, that I am one of those who considers Field Marshal Erik von Manstein one of the best operational minds to have fought in the Second World War. His achievment in the post-Stalingrad months (Dec 1942- Feb 1943) will go down as a classic in mobile warefare. Enough has been written about his 1939 operational plan to invade France to fill a volume. In short, he was the consumate military professional.
Which is why it pains me to offer only a 3 rating to his memiors. Don't get me wrong. The memior reads very well; the translation is excellent, and the prose is easy. My main complaint lies with the memior's content. I first read Lost Victories twenty years ago and took most of what Manstein wrote as fact. However, as I read more and more about not only the Wehrmacht, Germany, and Hitler, I began to doubt the narrative that von Manstein and the Feld Herren as a whole have been put to paper. This memior is long on ommisions, and short on introspection. Like other senior officers, Manstein piles the blame on the most senior Wehrmacht leadership while conviently excusing himself. The sad fact remains that von Manstein rarely vocalized any complaints concerning the Nazis treatment of men like Fritsch or Bloomberg (his former superiors sacked by Hitler), the introduction of the swatiska on thier uniforms, the establishment of the Waffen SS, or the treatment of Polish civilians, Jew, or captured officers. In his memiors, Manstein does take a few pages to offer his criticisms of Keitel (OKW) and von Braunstisch (OKH), yet not once did he explicitly critique in name the poor tactical generalship of either General Hoepner -the 4th Panzer Army Commander and his immediate commander during the initial stages of Barbarossa, or Field Marshall von Leeb -the overall commander of the Northern Army Group. This I thought was rather odd considering that these 2 men at that stage of the war still excercised complete freedom of movement. Manstein vaguely critiques the "High Command" (ie either the OKH or Hitler himself). Like other generals, Manstein leveled his stongest critiques on those that were dead, and thus couldn't defend themselves.
The Chapters covering Stalingrad at the battles along the Don are the most dramatic of the memior. Many do find fault with Manstein's decision not to relieve General Paulus of command of the 6th Army in November-December 1942. This was a period of high drama and emotion, when as most experts believe that the 6th Army could have broken out of Stalingrad. It was also the period of greatest danger when the entire front was collapsing back to Rostov. Manstein's reasons for not relieving Paulus are clear enough -namely he didn't have the authority to do so. The other reason, which he barely skirts around is the fact that the Soviets had nearly a half million men, 3000 guns, and 2000 tanks around Stalingrad. If the 6th Army did breakout, this vast force would be unleashed and the entire Don Bend as well as von Kleists Army Group in the Kuban would have been become a giant tomb for the Germans. Manstein after the war could have offered this terrible but truthful fact to the public, but instead said the sacrifice of the 180,000 men of the 6th Army was never an option. Somehow I do not believe him.
The last area of criticism is leveled at von Manstein's decision to back Zeitzler's (OKH) and Hitler's decision to strike at Kursk. In his memiors, he does say he strongly desired to wait until the Soviets struck first and then offer a counter blow on "the back hand". That is, he wished to conduct another mobile counter attack like he did earlier in March at Kharkov - this time from the Northwest and drive the Soviets offensive forces Southward into the Black Sea. This operation, brilliant in conception and most probably would have had sufficient motorized forces to execute was never considered. Hitler couldn't stomach the idea of giving another inch of territory (Manstein's plans included a planned withdraw initially so he could spring his trap), instead followed Zeitzler's idea of a pincer attack on the Kursk sailent. For some reason, von Manstein allowed himself to initially concur. Again, I find this strange. Manstein never was one to keep quiet when considering other people's failures. OKH's Kursks attack lacked imagination, was totally predictable and lacked any strategic value. On paper it looked like the "safe" plan. Even if it was successfull, Manstein, Zeitzler, Guderian, and most of all Hitler knew the Soviets had sufficient strength to bleed the outnumbered German's white. Manstein's plan, on the other hand, had all of the makings of a classic battle of annihilation, which could have bought Hitler another year, or maybe even a stalemate in the East.Yet, Manstein offered little defense of his plan.
Finally, von Manstein like Guderian, Halder, Kluge, Rundstedt, et als. said he had no prior knowledge of the Final Solution, Russian Slave Labour, and the killing of POWs. He says very little, but does offer up evidence of the Soviet's own crimes while he commanded the 56th Panzer Corps in the Courland. As time goes by, I find this harder and harder to believe.
Overall, the reader will have to judge for himself. Of all the memiors, this one is the best written, and there are many times where one can see Manstein's genius as he discusses in his cool, rational prose the many tactical and strategic problems he faced. He is also very kind when ever he writes about the enlisted soliders who served under him, especially the German NCOs. He was never an "armchair" general. Both as commander of the 38th Infantry Corps, and the 56th Panzer Corps he led from the front, and made his decisions based upon first hand knowledge. It was also heartbreaking to read about the death of his only son in 1943. While Erik von Manstein had many faults, he was anything but the stiff, monocoled Prussian caricture that some in the West like to paint of the Prussians. He was a brilliant yet flawed general. His memiors should be read, but critically so. While reading the memiors it is also good to keep in mind that her served one of the cruelist dictators of the 20th Century.
 A Memoir on Operational War... March 5, 2008
German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein wrote "Lost Victories" in 1955, ten years after the end of the Second World War and eleven years after he had been dismissed from command on the Russian Front by Adolf Hitler.
Von Manstein served in the German Army from 1914 through the First World War, the bitter interwar years, and the major campaigns of the Second World War in Europe. He was, by all accounts, a master of the operational level of war, whether as a commander or as an outstanding staff officer. His memoirs are still in print at least in part because his narrative powers were equal to the task of describing the military operations in the Second World War in which he participated. "Lost Victories" may provide as good an account from the German side of the War in Europe as we are likely to get from a participant. His understanding of the huge battle waged over an immense manuever space in Western Russia is almost as unique as the nature of the fighting itself. If his account is tinged with some "I" and "me", that is perhaps to be forgiven in an autobiography by a man who saw all too clearly the wasted strategic opportunities to conduct a war with a defined and achievable political purpose.
This book is highly recommended to students of the military art and of the Second World War.
 A "must read" WW2 strategy book January 12, 2008
It is a "must read" strategy book by the one of the best WW2 German generals. It is not the full memoirs. Still it is a 5 star (great) reading.
Must Read for Serious Student of World War II January 2, 2008
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Lost Victories is an excellent first-person memoir of some of the critical battles of the Second World War. Its primary focus is on the Eastern Front in Russia and the Ukraine; von Manstein speaks some about the attack on France in 1940 and opines on what might have been done with England thereafter, but for the most part, his command was in the East.
This is not a starter treatment of the Second World War, and it will appeal only to those readers who are looking for an in depth discussion of certain topics. It is not a comprehensive treatment of the war -- von Manstein naturally only discusses theaters in which he was involved directly, and the book generally focusses on military matters, leaving political topics for others. It also proceeds in some detail, occasionally even providing a division-by-division account of battles. That was sometimes more than I wanted, and I found it possible to skim some of the more detailed parts without sacrificing the overall discussion, however.
Those readers who seek a deeper understanding of the military conflict in the East will be rewarded. I found two features of the book particularly compelling. The first is the lengthy discussion of the Stalingrad endgame (the German Sixth Army was already encircled by the time von Manstein arrived on the scene). The second is the author's discussion of Hitler's strengths and (mostly) defects as a supreme military commander. There is a chapter devoted to this discussion, but the comments and impressions that von Manstein sprinkles throughout the other chapters are even more telling.
I had two small critcisms. First, the book would be more enjoyable with more and better maps, so that those of us who don't have a deep familiarity with the geography of southern Russia and the Ukraine can better place the action. There are a few maps, but they aren't always well-placed in the book and they often don't include all of the key locations.
Second, I wanted more discussion of Operation Citadel (Battle of Kursk), which was one of the critical engagements of the war. I think that von Manstein's actually wrote an in-depth discussion of this battle, but that the editors of this edition chose to replace it with a shorter discussion that the author wrote later for a magazine. That would explain why this chapter is uncharacteristically brief and why its style seems out of place with the others.
Overall, this is a fascinating read, and it has enriched my understanding of the war on the Eastern Front.
By Far The Best Memoir From German General In WWII January 2, 2008
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Lost Victories is superior to Guderian's Panzer Leader and also better than 'Panzer Battles'. The early chapters on the planning and evolution of the Polish and French campaigns is remarkable. Manstein accomplished the near impossible at Sevastopol and almost the impossible at Kursk where (as was often the case) his carefully laid plans were perverted by the powers above. His firm stance against getting German armies sucked into city fighting beginning with Warsaw were tragically forgotten by Stalingrad. His theories about mobile defence, attacking on the other side of a river to defend a bridgehead etc... were revolutionary for their time. It may have been a different story in Normandy in 1944 if Manstein had been in charge rather than the hodge podge of commands which included the discredited Rommel and the over the hill Rundstedt. One of the main reasons the Germans were defeated is that experienced, brilliant generals like Manstein were eventually replaced by yes man that far from strengthening Hitler's position hastened his downfall.
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