BLOODY RIVER (Texas a & M University Military History Series)

A battle involving one division over two days cries out for a personal treatment. Fans of Stephen Ambrose's histories should be forewarned, however, this is not a book that spends much time describing the combat faced by the average soldier. Rather, the emphasis is on the highest ranking officers involved in the planning and execution of the attack. The best historical accounts present the "big picture," but also give the reader the immediacy of accounts of individual participants. This book could have been improved with some eyewitness accounts from both armies.

The 36th Division's attack at the Rapido River was a disaster, and I assume that most readers know this before they buy the book. Most readers want to know what happened, and where blame lies. Mr. Blumenson places blame primarily with Gen. Walker, the commander of the 36th Division. Unfortunately, the book contains a number of statements that seem to contradict one another, or which cry out for more support in the text. For example:

1. Gen. Walker is faulted for keeping most of the "politically appointed" officers in the 36th, yet there is not much discussion of how the officers later performed.

2. There is a brief mention of the vital role the 36th played in the landings in Italy, and it appears that the 36th performed well in its first combat. Later, there is a mention that some officers felt that the performance of the 36th was close to a disaster, but there is no real discussion of these conflicting assessments.

3. There is discussion of the horrible odds the 36th was asked to overcome at the Rapido River(attacking over a rain-soaked plain, across a swollen river, against a well-fortified enemy, all while under observed artillery fire), and the author notes that the task would have daunted the most experienced forces. Later, the author implies that if Gen. Walker had been more gung-ho, his troops would have performed better, and possibly carried the day.

4. There is no discussion of how the 36th performed in southern France later in the war.

These examples are among many that presented problems. By the end of the book, most readers will agree that Gen. Walker could have done a better job in stopping the attack in the planning stages, or in executing the attack. Many readers will also agree that Gen. Walker's reluctance may have made his men more reluctant to push forward when things were going badly (although German minefields and constant shelling may have contributed to the troop's unwillingness to press the fight).

The ultimate question for most readers is whether the 36th division failed because of poor performance by its men, or whether it failed because it was given a task that most other divisions could not accomplish. Other than noting that the British fared little better in a previous attack in a nearby area, no answer is given. More discussion of the fortunes of the 36th before and after the Rapido River would have helped answer this question, but these portions of the book are the very portions that seem added-on. Ultimately the book doesn't answer the most pressing questions, nor does it provide a satisfying account of the battle.


Well-written and thought provoking!   December 3, 2000
 4 out of 4 found this review helpful

Blumenson's prowess as a military historian is well known and, while I would not rank this book among his greatest works, it clearly shows the skill of the author.

The focus of this monograph is the failed attempt by the 36th Infantry Division (Texas National Guard) to cross the Rapido River in Italy in January 1944. This particular battle was, of course, merely one small facet of the larger campaign to capture Monte Cassino and, ultimately, to capture Rome.

Blumenson does a good job of both presenting a chronological study of the battle itself and dealing with the individual personalities at play in the various U.S. Army officers. These personalities are crucial to the understanding of any endeavor, but are even more important in battle, as officers are more than mere computers that make decisions based purely on their training, background, and education. Officers make decisions based on ego, personality, fear, hatred, and a concern for the lives of their men (which is an underlying theme of this volume). The caution (if one can call it that) that Blumenson gives to students of military history is that a commander must value the lives of his men, but he can never allow the men to be more important than the mission.

The principle characters of Blumenson's drama are Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, commander of the 5th Army, Major General Geoffrey T. Keyes, commander of the II Corps, and Major General Fred L. Walker, commander of the 36th Infantry Division. One of the sources of contention between Clark, Keyes, and Walker was their difference in age. Now it is important to note that U.S. Army officers have always been taught to respect the chain of command and be loyal to their superiors. Nevertheless, it is easy to understand how an officer might feel slighted by having as his commander someone who is actually younger than him. This situation occurs most frequently during wars, since the rapid expansion of the Army accelerates promotions. In this instance, Clark was almost 10 years younger than both Keyes and Walker, while Keyes was a year younger than Walker. Keyes and Walker, therefore, were both somewhat resentful of Clark's rapid promotion, while Walker himself harbored a similar attitude toward Keyes. Another source of contention between Clark, Keyes, and Walker were their differences in personality. Blumenson describes Clark as, "aggressive, impatient, imperious in bearing, and inclined to be sharp of tongue," while he also had, ". . . a flair for publicizing himself and his activities." (19) Keyes was a just more pleasant individual, who had, ". . . a gift of tact," but Walker believed that he was, ". . . too impulsive, too restless, too flighty - in short, too cavalry - in outlook." (39-40) Walker, unlike his compatriots, was, ". . . diffident and self-effacing, patient and mild-mannered." (20) It is with these, as other issues, as a backdrop that Blumenson begins his examination of the battle itself.

During the Battle of the Rapido River, the comparatively inexperienced 36th Infantry Division would be faced by the battle-hardened German 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. Not only was the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division a much more experienced division, but it also occupied a carefully prepared defensive position, which had its forward edge along the Rapido River. Lastly, the 36th Infantry Division was expected to make a night river crossing despite the fact that its assembly areas were under full observation by the enemy during the day.

Ultimately, the 36th Infantry Division would be badly mauled in its attempt to cross the Rapido River. Who was to blame for the division's failure to secure its objectives? Who was to blame for the severe casualties that the division suffered? These are the questions for which Blumenson attempts to find answers, but it is the interplay of personalities, rather than the battle itself, that really makes his monograph worth reading.