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Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime | 
 enlarge | Author: Eliot A. Cohen
Publisher: Anchor
Category: Book
List Price: $15.00
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Avg. Customer Rating:  34 reviews
Sales Rank: 386114
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 320
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.6
Dimensions (in): 7.8 x 5.1 x 0.7
ISBN: 1400034043
Dewey Decimal Number: 322.5
EAN: 9781400034048
ASIN: 1400034043
Publication Date: September 9, 2003
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Product Description
The orthodoxy regarding the relationship between politicians and military leaders in wartime democracies contends that politicians should declare a military operation's objectives and then step aside and leave the business of war to the military. In this timely and controversial examination of civilian-military relations in wartime democracies, Eliot A. Cohen chips away at this time-honored belief with case studies of statesmen who dared to prod, provoke, and even defy their military officers to great effect.
Using the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion to build his argument, Cohen offers compelling proof that, as Clemenceau put it, “War is too important to leave to the generals.” By examining the shared leadership traits of four politicians who triumphed in extraordinarily varied military campaigns, Cohen argues that active statesmen make the best wartime leaders, pushing their military subordinates to succeed where they might have failed if left to their own devices. Thought provoking and soundly argued, Cohen's Supreme Command is essential reading not only for military and political players but also for informed citizens and anyone interested in leadership.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 29 more reviews...
 Vindicated by History September 10, 2008
Few authors get the endorsement that comes from seeing the President of the United States carrying their book around; even fewer get the satisfaction of seeing their theories proved by events. Mr. Cohen is a member of both groups.
Of course the photos of Bush holding his book have long been forgotten by everyone else, and the recent CYA attempts by Generals Sanchez and Keane have not been recognized for what they are by anyone else, but I'll bet Mr. Cohen has figured it out: Bush not only read his book but apparently took it to heart and implemented it.
It is clear now that Bush had to hunt through a Pentagon full of McClellans until he found his Grant and then had to defend said Grant (Petraeus) and his strategy against a whole host of critics within the Pentagon as well as without until victory was too obvious to ignore.
Mr. Cohen, take a bow. You've earned it.
Interesting book August 26, 2008
Supreme Command is definitely a worthwhile read for any student of military affairs. This is a consciously policy- rather than theory-oriented book, so don't look for any deep theoretical structures to Cohen's argument. At times the book loses a bit of focus, and it seems like he just wanted to find an excuse to write about these four leaders. But the book's central insight is a valid one--that, as S. Finer observed many years ago, an a-political, professional military can be just as much of a problem as a politicized one, and that leaders should be involved not only in grand strategy but also in certain operational details. Even if you won't agree with Cohen's conclusions, it will definitely make you think.
Good Book on Leadership June 20, 2008
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
There are a lot of good and lengthly reviews for this book, so I will be brief. This book is a fast read and is very interesting. Professor Cohen, head of Strategic Studies at John's Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS), lays out through representative case studies examples of civil-military command during war, with specific focus and emphasis on the interface of civilian command and military command. I thought the book was an excellent overview of some of the issues involved in this most important subject.
Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime April 7, 2008
This book takes a case study of four politicians (Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Ben Gurion and Winston Churchill) who solidly ruled their country in times of war. Cohen makes a distinction between these rulers and other rulers who set the objectives during conflict and then left it up to their military commanders to determine how the objectives were met. This is what Cohen calls the "normal" school of thought. None of these leaders followed this school of thought and still proved successful. Cohen points to many reasons for this success. The main reason for the success of these men was their competence. However, Cohen also points to more philosophical reasons for their success. One of these reasons is, as Clauswitz points out, that military conflict is by its very nature political and as such politicians should not opt out when objectives are set. Military leaders may not understand the political consequences of their decisions or may be incompetent themselves. As Cohen declares, "war is too important to be left up to generals." Generals spend most of their career practicing for war, but very little time actually putting that practice into action. So, although military leaders should be given some leeway so that they can do their job, they must also be overlooked and backed up by a strong political leader who can see the bigger picture. Also, as events change, political objectives may also change and need a politician's hand in making the situation come out favorably.
Overall, Cohen articulately points to the need for a strong executive branch in time of war and a military that is firmly subordinate to the government.
War is too important to be left to the generals August 3, 2007
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
According to the appendix of the book, there is civilian control because military expertise may be isolated. There is a theory of objective control, but it doesn't suffice. The leadership of a Lincoln, a Ben-Gurion, a Churchill does not depend upon the separation of the military sphere from the civilian sphere. Tolstoy described strategic nihilism. Waging war is a different activity than the practice of other professions. An experience curve, routinization, is lacking. Calamities do not stem from incompetence, per se. Effective wartime leaders show ruthlessness, mastery of detail, interest in technology. The leaders cited in the book interfered with the military professionals. In Clauswitz's view there is no line dividing the civil and military areas of control. There are differences. In the military there are rules, in politics there are none.
Abraham Lincoln both found his generals, Grant and Sherman, and controlled them. Jefferson Davis had more military qualifications than Lincoln. Lincoln's war was driven by the rifle, the telegraph, and the railroad--new technology. Assaults on field fortifications proved ruinous. Lincoln's strategic plan had to be modified in practice.
Visits to the front betokened Clemenceau's wartime civilian leadership. In 1917 he was seventy-six. He served during the last year of the war and the negotiation of the peace. When Poincare called upon Clemenceau to guide France, it was experiencing a blood bath. In visiting the front, (Clemenceau had also done this as a senator), Clemenceau was practicing management by walking around. He acquired information and influenced events.
Winston Churchill had strength, humor, readiness to listen, (he thought outside of the box). His wartime leadership has been attacked by historians, but the writer of this book disagrees with such negative assessments. It has been charged that Chruchill had a deplorable strategic sense. The existence of a Churchill Society, evidence of popular acclaim, makes serious historians wince. Details provided by Lord Moran, Churchill's physician, have suggested impairments from drink and aging tending to hurt Churchill's reputation.
Notwithstanding what critics have said, Churchill had system and he was a glutton for work. Disciplined habits drove his career. He could see the relationship between the large and the small. He was unprepared to take military judgments on faith because he distrusted bureaucracies and remembered World War I. Churchill developed grand strategy, cultivating the Americans and the Russians in order to win the war. He excelled at holding together the alliance. He engaged in incessant close-questioning of his military staff. Churchill needed to goad his commanders into action. He mastered political rhetoric.
This book is a marvel of good arguments supported by telling details.
The theme is that greater exertion by civilian leadership ensures a better outcome in instances of last resort, i.e. nations finding it necessary to go to war.
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