War and Punishment

What makes wars drag on and why do they end when they do? Here H. E. Goemans brings theoretical rigor and empirical depth to a long-standing question of securities studies. He explores how various government leaders assess the cost of war in terms of domestic politics and their own postwar fates. Goemans first develops the argument that two sides will wage war until both gain sufficient knowledge of the other's strengths and weaknesses so as to agree on the probable outcome of continued war. Yet the incentives that motivate leaders to then terminate war, Goemans maintains, can vary greatly depending on the type of government they represent. The author looks at democracies, dictatorships, and mixed regimes and compares the willingness among leaders to back out of wars or risk the costs of continued warfare.

Democracies, according to Goemans, will prefer to withdraw quickly from a war they are not winning in order to appease the populace. Autocracies will do likewise so as not to be overthrown by their internal enemies. Mixed regimes, which are made up of several competing groups and which exclude a substantial proportion of the people from access to power, will likely see little risk in continuing a losing war in the hope of turning the tide. Goemans explores the conditions and the reasoning behind this "gamble for resurrection" as well as other strategies, using rational choice theory, statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Germany, Britain, France, and Russia during World War I. In so doing, he offers a new perspective of the Great War that integrates domestic politics, international politics, and battlefield developments.

Goemans' thesis proceeds from a simple yet provocative premise; that leaders decide to either prosecute or cease fighting at least partly based on how the terms of settlement affect their postwar fate. The author argues that the belligerents make an initial assessment of their chances to succeed in their war aims based on what they learn from their engagements with the enemy, and that such battlefield assessment is a critical factor in determining what is possible in terms of settling the hostilities. He shows how different kinds of regimes blend this assessment with both their understanding of the international structure they are operating within as well as with their own domestic political considerations. According to the author, war settlement is only possible when a situation he refers to as "bargaining space" develops, i.e., both sides come to similar conclusions regarding the likely outcome as well as the advantages of settling now rather than later.

Goemans is at his best when arguing for a more sophisticated appreciation for how this multiplicity of factors interacts in a dynamic setting that is "realpolitik", and demonstrates how such mutually reinforcing factors influence the war goals and determination of future action by individual belligerents. For example, in a telling example Hoemans illustrates that in spite of a stunning defeat at Verdun, the French decided to escalate their war aims; their collective faith in the personal capabilities of Robert Nivelle were so great that they expected to gain the advantage despite all the setbacks. Likewise, his consideration of how domestic political circumstances and the subjective reading of the international situation by both German and Russian officials influenced the course and outcome of the war.

His scholarly approach as well as an unfortunate tendency toward continuing use of very carefully constructed terms and phrases may at times seem a bit repetitive and initially a bit off-putting to the general reader, yet understanding the academic tone of the book, seems perfectly understandable. The author is, after all, writing a book for other academics rather than for a general audience, even though I'm confident that many serious students of military history will find this particular academic book a fascinating and useful read. When all is said and done, this is a very interesting book, and it is one I highly recommend to those students of military history who appreciate the amazingly complex interaction of a welter of factors in determining the onset, progress, and termination of war.


Goemans hits a home run   November 20, 2000
 27 out of 28 found this review helpful

It is the height of hubris to think that you can write something new, interesting, and important on the subject of war. Armed conflict has been at the center of discussion, writing, and study as far back as there has been writing. But Goemans has actually done it. This book is provocative, timely, and timeless. It should be read by anyone who is interested in war, peace, or history. (The case studies on World War I are easily worth the price of the book whatever you think of the main thesis!)