The War of 1812: A FORGOTTEN CONFLICT | 
 enlarge | Author: Donald R. Hickey
Publisher: University of Illinois Press
Category: Book
List Price: $24.00
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Avg. Customer Rating:  14 reviews
Sales Rank: 82554
Media: Paperback
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 457
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.4
Dimensions (in): 8.9 x 6 x 1
ISBN: 0252060598
Dewey Decimal Number: 973.52
EAN: 9780252060595
ASIN: 0252060598
Publication Date: October 1, 1990
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Amazon.com Review
The War of 1812 gave the United States some of its finest military moments: Admiral Perry's victory on Lake Erie, Andrew Jackson's lopsided triumph at the Battle of New Orleans, the immortal words "Don't give up the ship!," and Fort McHenry's defense of Baltimore (which inspired Francis Scott Key to write "The Star-Spangled Banner"). At the same time, the fighting didn't go especially well for the Americans. Their invasion of Canada failed and the British burned the White House to the ground. The conflict ended in a draw. With The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict Donald R. Hickey offers what may be the most comprehensive treatment of the war, and includes many colorful anecdotes. For example, shortly after the mortally wounded James Lawrence uttered "Don't give up the ship!," his men did just that. Their vessel was hauled off to England, broken up, and its timbers used in the construction of a flour mill. The subtitle calls the War of 1812 a "forgotten conflict"; Hickey's excellent book shows why it's worth remembering.
Product Description
This first comprehensive history of the War of 1812 since Henry Adam's work of a century ago is a myth-shattering study that will inform and entertain students, historians, and general readers. Donald R. Hickey explores the military, diplomatic, and domestic history of our second war with Great Britain.
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The standard October 23, 2008
Even 20 years after its publication, this work remains one of the finest treatments of the War of 1812. It is especially strong on the diplomacy and domestic politics of the period. The writer's style, though a bit dry, is nevertheless thoroughly readable.
 The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict. By Donald R. Hickey. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989. xvi + 457 pp.) October 22, 2007
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Donald R. Hickey departs from conventional approaches to studying what is "probably our most obscure war" (p.1). The War of 1812 is a scathing indictment of the Republicans who waged an unnecessary and costly war that simply concluded with a restoration of the antebellum order and, in the process, almost plunged the nascent country into civil war. Yet the Republicans, with their penchant for phantasmagoria, spun the war into a great victory, claiming that they had "defeated `the conquerors of Europe,'" and "'virtually dictate[d] the treaty of Ghent'" (p. 309). The Treaty of Ghent, did not touch on impressment, the main U.S. grievance against Great Britain, but was, nevertheless, the "most significant [American] victory" of the war, "not because of what the envoys won but because of what they avoided losing" (p. 281).
The War of 1812 is billed as America's "second war of independence," but Hickey contends that the "supposed threat to American independence in 1812...existed mainly in the minds of thin-skinned Republicans who were unable to shake the ideological legacy of the Revolution" (p.300). While ultimately the war was fought over maritime issues, chief among them impressment, it held many potential benefits for the Republicans, who, as heirs to the Revolution, were "steeped in Anglophobia" (p. 26). Republicans saw in the war opportunities to: reinforce republican institutions; further American diplomatic aims in the Northwest as well as on the high seas, and; gain significant political dividends vis-a-vis the Federalists. A new Indian war had also broken out on the western frontier in 1811 and most Americans blamed the uprisings on England. The mood in many parts of the country was thus sympathetic to war.
Hickey presents the war as an exercise in brinksmanship gone terribly awry. Madison declared war and dispatched peace feelers simultaneously. Britain, already embroiled in a European war, was not keen to commit troops to another conflict. In fact, even in the peace negotiations to end the war, "Great Britain had to rely on second-rate men because her top officials were busy with European affairs" (p. 285).
Hickey makes no attempt to conceal his deep antipathy for Republicans. He is critical of their policies and actions, and rightly so. But his defense of British policies in the lead-up to the war is often excessive, at times even bordering on ridiculous. On page 14, for instance, he observes that while the British refused to comply with the U.S. request to end their practice of impressment, "they did offer to observe `the greatest caution' in impressing British seamen [on American vessels]." He adds that "Britain showed such a conciliatory spirit on the other issues" that Monroe and Pinkney concluded that the Monroe-Pinnkey Treaty of 1806, which he faults Jefferson for failing to present to the Senate, "was in many ways more favorable to the United States than the Jay Treaty had been." The Jay Treaty, anathema to Republicans, is hardly a suitable standard by which to gauge the favorableness of treaties as the Republicans could hardly conceive of anything less favorable than it, save for outright colonization. For Hickey, the advantages of the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty are endless, but "Best of all, the treaty contained a kind of insurance clause that bound the British to indemnify any merchant whose vessel was detained in violation of the treaty" (p.14). Such unrestrained subjective enthusiasm belongs in an infomercial for car polish, not an academic book. All that generous Great Britain asked for in exchange for the "significant" concessions it offered was "little more than a promise of benevolent neutrality" (p. 14). But the intransigent Jefferson was unwilling to relinquish the weapon of commercial sanctions without a British promise to end impressment, in part because he was convinced that France and Russia would ultimately prevail in the European war and force the British to accept a much broader definition of natural rights. In rejecting the treaty, the United States declined to re-forge the Anglo-American accord of the 1790s and "to substitute peace and prosperity for commercial restrictions and war." Hickey's overzealous attempt to justify British behavior tarnishes an otherwise fine book; it is at once gratuitous and unconvincing. It does nothing to advance his thesis that the war was unnecessary or further his description of the Republicans as lacking in diplomatic finesse, strategic vision and military aptitude. There is no question that in 1812 the United States was ill-prepared for war. A country of seven-and-a-half million people that could not even muster a victory over Canada, population 500,000, stood virtually no chance against British hegemony. But that does not mitigate British excesses, particularly on impressment, a flagrant breach of U.S. sovereignty.
Far more interesting than the relationship between the United States and Great Britain was wartime interaction among Americans. Hickey's examination of domestic wartime dynamics is superb. His survey of the Baltimore Riots and their aftermath is the highlight of the book. One of the war's ostensible goals was to protect republican institutions, yet Madison refused to send troops to the Baltimore Post Office when it came under attack from Republican mobs seeking to prevent delivery of the Federal Republican. Madison "conceded that the post office was `under the sanction of the U.S.,' [but] he doubted that `any defensive measures, were within the Executive sphere'" (p. 67). Republicans did not welcome opposition to their war policy, but they did not invoke sedition laws as the Federalists had done. Madison, did, after all, draft the Bill of Rights. Absent an official ban on opposition, however, Republican mobs "had their own way of suppressing dissent, and the result was a chilling message for all who opposed the war" (p. 70).
The War of 1812 was a textbook example of poor leadership. Republicans were constitutionally opposed to a large defense establishment, arguing that "it fostered special interest groups that posed a danger to republican government" (8). In keeping with this antipathy toward defense establishment, they cut the peacetime army from 5,400 to 3,300 in 1802. In an 1808 war scare, they increased the army to almost 10,000 men and used the expanded officer corps to reward supporters. Nepotism was widespread and adversely affected wartime morale. Winfield Scott, "who served with these officers in the War of 1812, claimed that most `were imbeciles and ignoramuses" (p. 8). One reason the Republicans went to war "without adequate preparation was that they expected American troops to be welcomed in Canada" (p.73). That never happened, in part because militias repeatedly refused to cross the border, "standing on their supposed right to serve only in American territory" (p.88), which brought to the fore interpretive ambiguities of the fledgling Constitution.
In the interest of objectivity, Hickey defends the Republicans against claims that "agrarian cupidity" (p. 72) put them on the warpath. "Annexationist fever was particularly strong in the West" (p. 75), but Hickey is unconvinced that land acquisition was central to the Republican decision to wage war. He also concedes that although the War of 1812 was remarkably unremarkable, "Americans were never again subjected to those dubious maritime practices that had caused the war" (p.307).
Hickey intended for this book to appeal to both generalists and specialists. Invariably, such books frustrate both audiences. Detailed accounts of battles, commendable for their detail, will appeal to specialists, but are likely to overwhelm generalists. Translations of basic Latin phrases like status quo ante bellum, on the other hand, will annoy specialists. General readers will find many interesting factoids in this book. For instance, U.S. Certificates of Citizenship were introduced to protect Americans from impressment. This did little to assuage the British, however, because forged documents were readily available.
The War of 1812 was a compendium of ironies: it nearly destroyed the republican institutions it was intended to bolster. The only permanent land acquisition made during the war--part of Spanish West Florida--"came at the expense of a neutral power rather than the enemy" (p.303). Hickey attributes the war's obscurity to its lack of success. That is only half true. The war certainly would be much better remembered had it been highly successful, but the same would hold true had it been an abysmal failure. Great failures, after all, are often just as impressive as great successes.
A Good Detailed Summary December 8, 2006
I boought this book to fill in my mental gap between the revolution and the civil war, and it filled the bill. The writing is clear and the subject covered very well. The research is deep and well documented. The writing style is dry and without any human interest, which is why I began life without an interest in history. Fortunately that changed, but this book won't turn around any students life in the way mine was by an excellent teacher. Regardless it is worth a buy.
A Concise Look at a Forgotten War November 1, 2005
4 out of 5 found this review helpful
The War of 1812 is without a doubt one of the more forgotten episodes of American History. Most casual students of history can name only a couple of facts about a conflict that was the first American declared war after the Revolutionary War. Yet this important conflict deserves much more attention by historians than it is given justice, especially in light of current world events and contemporary politics, which in many ways the War of 1812 reflects.
This book would serve both the casual student of history as well as the serious academic researcher, for it's readability along with its comprehensiveness. There is a wealth of information, including all the major campaigns, as well as the politics and economics behind the conflict.
The only real criticism of this work comes in the form of its conciseness, that is, it occasionally glosses over some topics, which deserve more tribute. This oftentimes, however, is unavoidable when writing nonfiction due to the limited amount of source material.
It has been said that the book gives an uneven assessment of the conflict, because it doesn't give enough information from the British point of view. This may be true, however, this is a book about American History, and is intentionally written with an American audience in mind. Either way, it still gives an objective assessment of a great conflict in American History that is, sadly, too often overlooked.
 quick delivery.. great price July 9, 2005
0 out of 7 found this review helpful
Right book.. delivered quickly at a great price.. what more could you ask for?
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